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Critics of America's support for conservative monarchs
in the Middle East have pointed out disturbing parallels
between the current situation in Morocco and conditions that
existed in Iran prior to the fall of the shah. The purpose
of this thesis is to assess the validity of such
comparisons
.
The author analyses the forces leading to revolution in
Iran in terms of five categories: domestic, Islamic, lead-
ership, economic and foreign. The stability of the Moroccan
regime is then assessed using these categories as a guide.
Because of its clear bearing on future developments in the
country, Morocco's war in the Western Sahara is also
discussed even though it falls outside of the categories
drawn from the Iranian experience.
The author concludes that, although it is impossible to
rule out an assassin's bullet or a military coup, an indige-
nous mass uprising comparable to that which led to the fall
of the shah does not appear imminent in Morocco. The king's
stability is based on several factors absent in the Iranian
case, including his wider power base, his role as an Islamic
leader, the historic identification of his crown with
nationalism, increased opportunities for political partici-
pation, restrained foreign associations and, most impor-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
"Iran, because of the great leadership of the shah, is
an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of
the world." [Ref. 1: pp 7-9] This toast, delivered by
President Carter to the Shah of Iran at the Niavaran Palace
in Tehran on New Years Eve 1977, soon returned to haunt the
United States. In only a year, the shah would be forced
into exile, condemned to live out his remaining days as a
stateless pariah, helpless while his country and its insti-
tutions fell into total collapse^ [Ref. 2: pp. 86-7].
In 1981 and 1984, riots swept through the Kingdom of
Morocco. Among the slogans shouted by the rioting crowds
was this chilling Arabic play on the name of Morocco's
ruler. King Hassan II: "Shah the first, Hassan the second!"
[Ref. 3: p. 31] Such anti-regime sentiments seemed to
confirm the fears of critics of America's support for the
region's conservative monarchs , who were troubled by the
similarities between the shah and the king. They contend
^The Shah of Iran was the second of America's "three
kings" to fall in the 1970s. For the preceding 25 years,
the U.S. had maintained mutually supportive relationships,
under what the State Department termed the "three kings'
principle", with the monarchies of Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Ethiopia. In addition, Morocco, Pakistan, and on occasion
Jordan had joined in the relationship.
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that close association with the United States stimulates
domestic and international opposition to King Hassan's
regime. In addition, they argue that the "intense and
demonstrative" nature of U.S. support for the Moroccan
monarchy works in opposition to America's other important
interests in North Africa, such as its growing commercial
relationship with Algeria [Ref. 4: p. 6].
King Hassan must resolve problems associated with the
forces of modernization as well as problems related to his
country's condition of structural dependence. In that
sense, the analogy between the king and the shah is apt.
This thesis will examine the validity of this analogy by
assessing the similarities and the differences between
conditions in Morocco and pre-revolutionary Iran. It should
be noted, however, that the primary purpose of this thesis
is to assess the stability of the Moroccan regime.
Therefore, conditions in Morocco will be discussed in some-
what greater detail than those in Iran. The impact of the
conflict in the Western Sahara, although outside of the
Iran/Morocco comparison, will also receive attention because
of the problems it presents for Morocco's king.
B . METHODOLOGY
Numerous policy makers, policy analysts, academics and
members of the popular press have analyzed the causes of the
Iranian Revolution. Despite considerable differences of
political perspective, most analysts are in relative agree-
ment on the conditions which led to the shah's fall.
However, as Professor Robert Looney has pointed out, these
conventional explanations for the Iranian revolution are
built on a tautological argument; i.e., "the revolution
occurred because all . the conditions for revolution were
present." [Ref. 5: pp. 254-5]
This thesis does not presume to explain the genuine root
causes of the Iranian revolution, instead it seeks to
outline the conditions generally conceded to have made it
inevitable. For our purposes, a simple characterization of
the factors which were preconditions for revolution in Iran
is adequate. By comparing these factors to conditions in
Morocco in the same categories, it should be possible to
assess the validity of the analogies drawn between King
Hassan and the Shah of Iran.
I believe that the comparison will show that the simi-
larities between the two monarchs are somewhat overstated.
On careful examination, the Moroccan monarchy's "doomsday
clock" does not stand at two minutes to midnight. King
Hassan, throughout his reign has consistently bought the
time required to continue the gradual modernization of his
nation while postponing the inevitable conflict when modern
ideals clash with traditional interests.
Before proceeding with the comparison between Morocco
and Iran, we must understand the environment with which the
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two traditional rulers had to cope. Its most significant
features, from the regime-stabilty perspective, are related
to the process of modernization and the condition of depen-
dency. The following chapter will describe the links
between these phenomena and how they effected royal
authority in Morocco and Iran.
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II. MODERNIZATION AND DEPENDENCY
A. MODERNIZATION
In the view of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,
the fall of the shah was a classic example of the clash
between traditional and modern authority [Ref. 6: p. 345].
The far-reaching changes wrought on Iranian society by the
country's windfall oil wealth, the almost overnight growth
in the size of its industrial and military establishments,
the increasing occurrence of corruption in official life,
all had a tremendous impact on Iran's traditional patterns.
A Pakistani poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, likened the impact of
modernization on Islamic society to the "shattering of the
glass." [Ref. 7: pp. 31-2] In the aftermath of the Iranian
revolution, it's clear that modernization, not Islam, bore
the brunt of the shattering impact. The inevitability of
the clash between modernization and tradition is at the
heart of the problem Samuel Huntington describes as the
"king's dilemma." [Ref. 8: p. 177]
The "king's dilemma" has particular relevance to rulers
such as King Hassan and the Shah of Iran. Huntington, a
leading- spokesman of moderate conservative thought, coined
the term to describe the situation confronting reforming
rulers in traditional society. Huntington argues that the
12
reforming monarch's regime is inevitably threatened by-
forces of modernity emanating from the very reforms he orig-
inated. His classic work Political Order in Changing
Societies provides the basis for the discussion of the prob-
lems of modernizing monarchs which follows.
1. Impact on Stability
Huntington argues that there is a strong correlation
between political instability and rapid social change.
Although modernity once attained breeds stability, the
process of modernization and reform breeds instability. In
his view, the degree of instability is related to the rate
of modernization. However, the failure to modernize creates
an even worse situation. The ruler who chooses not to
modernize faces the prospect of chronic instability, charac-
teristic of a backward society and a constant need to exer-
cise despotic power to control that society and sustain his
crown. In addition, a variety of pressures originating form
domestic and international sources encourage rulers to
modernize
.
1. Security considerations. Existing regimes often
inaugurate reforms themselves to avoid being over-
thrown, replaced, or entirely displaced (i.e., Turkey
after WWI , Egypt after Palestine failure). Thus,
reform is often the "child of military failure."
Conversely, successful reform, particularly the
centralization of power, increases the likelihood of
military success.
2. Domestic pressure. The principle threat to the
stability of traditional societies comes from within.
In the 20th century, monarchs reform not so much to
13
thwart imperialism as to thwart revolution. The king
must counter the invasion of foreign ideas, not
foreign armies. Rulers naturally conclude that, if
they do not modernize, someone else will. [Ref. 8:
pp. 155-6]
Once the king decides to initiate a modernizing
process, he can follow one of two courses. He can opt for a
controlled, top-down modernization process with himself at
the helm; or he can choose to be less directly involved by
initiating reforms that promote modernization via a consti-
tutional system where both power and authority are shared.
[Ref. 7: p. 42]
The shah and King Hassan, like most modern monarchs
,
tried to have it both ways. Both tried out various versions
of parliamentary monarchy. However, neither was willing to
take steps that would result in any significant devolution
of their power. In reality, therefore, the shah and the
king became the chief forces for modernization within their
countries
.
According to Huntington, monarchs committed to
modernization must first effect the transfer of power from
traditional power centers (i.e., regional, aristocratic,
religious, and ethnic) to central national institutions, and
then concentrate authority in a single individual (the king)
within those institutions. One critical struggle that
usually develops pits the "modernizing" monarch against his
"traditional" bureaucracy. Until the bureaucracy is
"converted", the monarch can not effectively implement
14
modernizing measures. An even more critical struggle
occurs between the monarch and previously autonomous centers
of traditional power such as the mullahs in Iran and the
marabouts in Morocco. A state is not truly modern until
these struggles have been won so that claims of state and
nation take priority . over the "more parochial claims of
family, class and clan." [Ref. 8: pp. 156-7]
The subordination of such timeworn traditional
claims requires a fundamental shift in values. In the
process, traditional man transfers his loyalty and identifi-
cation from immediate groups such as family and clan to
larger, more impersonal groups such as class and nation. At
the intellectual level, social mobilization involves a
tremendous increase in knowledge. Demographically , mobili-
zation leads to increased life expectancy, greater
geographic mobility and extreme changes in the pattern of
life. In sum, social mobilization is the process by which
the old commitments are broken, and people, as a consequence
of literacy, education, media exposure, mass communications
and urbanization, begin to adopt the values and aspirations
of the modern world.
The process of modernization, of course, requires
not only aspirations but capabilities. Thus social mobili-
zation must be accompanied by economic development for
modernization to take place. In almost every case, social,
economic and cultural modernization change and eventually
15
destroy the traditional political system. However this does
not necessarily result in movement toward modern political
systems. Huntington identifies three characteristic indica-
tors of the change from a traditional to a modern polity.
First, political modernization requires the ration-
alization of authority. By replacing traditional, religious
and ethnic political authorities with a single, secular
national political authority, modernization implies that
government is the product of men, not God. Secondly, modern
polities may be distinguished by differentiation of struc-
ture. This is achieved by developing autonomous but subor-
dinate structures to accomplish functions that had been in
the political realm. In differentiated structures, office
and power are distributed by achievement, not ascription.
Finally, political modernization entails expansion of polit-
ical participation by social groups throughout the society.
Note that broadened participation not only enhances control
of the government by the people in democratic states, but
also works to enhance the control of the people by the
government in totalitarian states. Thus, political partici-
pation and democracy are not synonymous. [Ref. 8: p. 34]
2. The King' s Dilemma
The gap between theory and the actual political
effects of social, economic and cultural modernization is
often vast. In the Islamic world, mobilization, economic
16
development and to some extent political participation have
occurred to varying degrees. However, with the exception of
Israel, the Middle East offers no examples where rational-
ized authority and differentiated political structures have
truly endured. [Ref. 8: p. 35]
The gap which typically exists between social and
political development increases the potential for conflict
between traditional and modern elements of society. The
process of social mobilization continues to create new
groups of elites, increasingly well-educated and exposed to
Western ideas and values. Their modern aspirations, often
based on an inflated estimation of their own achievements,
directly conflict with those of the traditional elites,
whose authority is inherited. Many of the conflicts eventu-
ally erupt into violence. This explains why much of the
modernizing world is characterized by coups, revolts and a
tendency toward autocratic, one-party regimes. These condi-
tions have led to a certain pessimism about the future of
royal authority.
The various pressures which compel the king to
modernize in effect seal the eventual doom of the crown in
the following way. First, the modernizing monarch must
seize and centralize the power formerly held by such tradi-
tional forces as the church, landholding aristocrats and
perhaps tribal chiefs. Then he must develop a modern
bureaucracy that shares his goals and maintains a corporate
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interest separate from that of the traditional factions.
Since this new bureaucracy is likely to be drawn from
segments of society other than its traditional layers,
increased social and political mobility are associated with
modernization. The bureaucracy and the monarchy are pitted
on one side against the religious, aristocratic and tribal
opposition on the other. The goals of the latter groups, of
course, are to preserve traditional society and their privi-
leged position in it. Ironically, the traditional forces
often espouse such modernizing values as liberty, constitu-
tionalism and representative government as a method of
blocking the monarch's efforts at centralization and reform.
With the cooperation of the new "intelligentsia", tradition-
alists try to associate liberty with traditional pluralism
in the ensuing struggle against the "despotic" equality of
the reforming monarch. [Ref. 8: p. 160]
Even if the king is successful in the initial phase
of his struggle with the traditional forces, there is always
the danger that power will eventually become too
concentrated in the monarchy to allow society to assimilate
the forces unleashed by reform. This is the crux of the
"king's dilemma." Without the authority of the monarch the
reforms could never have been launched. Yet the success of
those reforms undermines the legitimacy of the traditional
monarch who may have had to suspend elections, parliament
and political parties to effect modernization. Thus, the
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modernizing monarch finds himself the prisoner of institu-
tions which made modernization possible. Able to transform
society, but unable to transform itself, the monarchy is
eventually devoured by its modern progeny. In the end, the
king is victim of his own success. [Ref. 8: p. 177]
Typical observations about monarchies in the Islamic
world are that they are fragile, not deeply rooted, indivi-
sible and incompatible with modern values [Ref. 9: p. 167].
Historical evidence reinforces this gloomy assessment of the
prospects for monarchs . The list of Islam's fallen monarchs
has grown at a steady rate: Egypt, 1952; Tunisia, 1956;
Iraq, 1958; Yemen, 1962; South Arabia, 1967; Libya, 1969;
Afghanistan, 1973; and Iran, 1979. Nonetheless, those
monarchies which remain appear to be remarkably resilient.
Michael Hudson lists the following attributes of the
perfectly legitimized, ideal Islamic monarchy, a monarchy
entirely congruent with the values of the traditional polit-
ical culture.
1. The monarchy would take the form of an Islamic theoc-
racy, governed by the ablest leaders of a tribe
tracing its lineage to the prophet.
2. The ruler's authority would rest not only in his
coercive power but in the respect of his people for a
leader on the right path.
3. The principle criterion for the ruler's legitimate
authority would be his personal adherence to relig-
ious standards and kinship loyalties, not the office
or institution of kingship itself. [Ref. 9: p. 167]
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Neither the shah nor King Hassan closely resemble
this ideal. Both rulers have relied on their coercive
powers to a far greater extent than any authority they might
derive as "father figures." King Hassan has thus far
managed to postpone the challenge posed by the "king's
dilemma." The shah, on the other hand, tried to use his
vast oil wealth to circumvent this challenge. Nonetheless,
he eventually had to face the forces unleashed by moderniza-
tion. At that point he hesitated to use his coercive power
and was destroyed by those forces which were largely of his
own creation.
B. DEPENDENCY
The situation of structural dependency that exists for
the nations of the developing world aggravates the already
serious problems modernization poses for reform-minded
rulers. In the Middle East, a pattern of unequal exchange
has typified relationships between the major European powers
and the relatively weak local states since the colonial era.
Although Morocco and Iran retained their nominal sovereignty
throughout the age of empire, neither has ever been truly
free to set its own course as an independent actor in the
international system.
The French formula of protectorate in Morocco had only
provided Moroccans with what Marshall Lyautey described as
the "illusion of independence." [Ref. 10: p. 16] Although
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the French officially acknowledged the sovereignty of the
sultan, the country was in fact ruled for over 40 years, by
the French resident general. The Treaty of Fez, imposed
upon Morocco by the French in 1912, stripped the sultan of
the real attributes of sovereignty. The treaty stipulated
that the sultan was na longer responsible for his country's
foreign policy, its internal government or its defense. His
only power was negative, in that he could refuse to assent
to the laws proposed by the resident general thereby
impeding their implementation. [Ref. 10: p. 17]
Unlike Morocco, or for that matter most of the Middle
East, Iran was never under the direct control of a colonial
power. Nonetheless, Iran's freedom of political maneuver
was also severly limited. Both Great Britain and Russia
exercised considerable influence over Iran's royal court in
the 19th century. The two imperial powers continually
conspired against each other and, with the collusion of the
corrupt Qajar dynasty, were able to squelch any independent
Persian foreign policy initiatives. The British sought to
guarantee their transportation routes across the Persian
Gulf to India as well as provide a buffer against Russian
aggression for the jewel of the empire. The Russians cast
avaricious eyes on Iran as a step on their historic march
toward warm waters. [Ref. 11: p. 7]
In this century Great Britain, Russia, Germany and the
United States have had immense influence over Iran's
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domestic political affairs. When Reza Shah (father of
Iran's last shah) deposed the last Qajar in 1926, his goals
were to restore Persian greatness and to end the foreign
interference which had marked the Qajars' reign. However,
he misjudged the effect his apparent pro-German sympathies
prior to the outbreak of World War II would have on Allied
willingness to intervene in Iran's internal and external
affairs once hostilities began. The Allied Powers jointly
occupied Iran forcing Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his
son in 1941. Mohammed Reza Shah immediately assumed his
father's throne, doomed by his age (21) and inexperience to
reign as the virtual puppet of the Western Allies.
[Ref. 12: pp. 54-7]
1. The Psychology of Dependence
While it had to be recognized that the West was the
prime mover in bringing about the Arab awakening, in
introducing sanitation, education and other mass
benefits into the Arab world, the West assumed for the
Arab mind the character of a sinister j inni , a hateful
enemy, and a convenient whipping-boy who could be blamed
for all the problems that beset the Arabs. [Ref. 13: p.
300]
The psychological impact of structural dependence in
the Middle East has produced a phenomenon described by
Raphael Patai as the "Arab inferiority complex." [Ref. 13:
p. 313] It is important to emphasize that this phenomenon
did not end with independence. Patai makes the case that
the West actually managed to increase its cultural influence
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in the Middle East as its political influence weakened.
[Ref. 13: pp. 273-4] Western influence grew despite
Morocco's full independence from France in 1956 and despite
Iran's military and economic dominance of the region. The
fact remained that both Iran and Morocco entered the last
quarter of the 20th century deeply penetrated by external
powers and still struggling with imperialism's legacy.
Virtually every expert writing of the revolution has
concluded that the weight of this burden was an important
factor in the shah's downfall. Although Morocco's colonial
legacy and dependency are of a slightly different nature,
the manner in which Morocco's king carries his burden will
influence regime stability there as well.
In Morocco, dependency after "independence" followed
the classic pattern: direct investment in the most stra-
tegic sectors of the economy, asymmetrical trade relations,
heavy financial reliance on sources controlled by the
center, military cooperation and training programs, and
various cultural and economic mechanisms. [Ref. 14 : p . 9]
Iran, because of its oil wealth, was able to avoid some of
the symptoms of economic dependency. Nonetheless, Iran's
overall dependency in its relations with center nations was
virtually as pronounced as Morocco's.
Galtung describes dependency as an unequal exchange
between center and peripheral nations in the following five
categories: economic, political, military, communication
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and cultural [Ref. 15: p. 9]. Conditions in both pre-
revolutionary Iran and Morocco seem consistent with this
pattern. Both nations occupy structural positions in the
international system that require them to rely on center
nations for:
1. Political decision models (theoretically "constitu-





2. Military equipment (primarily French and American for
Morocco, primarily American for Iran).
3. Means of communication (both are reliant on Western
technology)
.
4. System of education (European education a must for
elite status )
.
This degree of penetration has led to more than just
extreme economic and socio-political distortions. Frantz
Fanon has noted among the formerly colonized^ a willingness
to admit the inferiority of their own culture [Ref. 16: p.
236], This denial of one's own heritage is in part a result
of the dominant powers' deliberate attempts to destroy the
colonized' s links with their own history [Ref. 17: p. 112].
The imperial powers displayed a fundamentally chau-
vinistic attitude toward the indigenous society. The idea
of uplifting the masses, as expressed in concepts like the
"mission civilisatrice" for the French or the "white man's
burden", for the British, provided the ethical justification
^Fanon uses the word colonized in its normative rather
than literal sense.
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for imperialist intervention [Ref. 9: p. 121]. The center
nations' barely masked contempt for the native populations
and local culture is typified by the French word "evolue",
an incredible term meaning evolved to a higher state when
applied to francophile natives [Ref. 18: p. 214].
The tendency toward self-hatred on the part of the
colonized is exacerbated by the apparent powerlessness of
the dominated culture to retain its own identity. The
attraction of Western superiority in all material, economic,
technological and organizational fields has proven
irresistible. The path of modernization requires imitation
of Western methods in all of these fields. To do so inevi-
tably leads to embracing selected Western values while it
requires adjusting or abandoning an equivalent number of
traditional beliefs.
As Fanon points out, it is organically impossible
for "a culture to modify any one of its customs without at
the same time re-evaluating its deepest values, its most
stable models." [Ref. 19: pp. 41-2] Dependency on the West,
an unavoidable by-product of the modernizing process, has
disrupted many of Islam's traditional priorities. From the
Islamic perspective, the counter-acculturation process
produces a conflict between Western values, which are felt
to be clearly secondary, and such true values as religion
and morality. Local people are left with the suspicion that
by imitating the West they are debasing themselves. At the
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same time they realize that they can never stop imitating
the West if they wish to continue to modernize. This is the
root of the "Arab inferiority complex." Forced to import
Western criteria, the overwhelming margin of Western superi-
ority undercuts their self-esteem and underscores their
impotence. [Ref. 13: pp. 297-300]
In Morocco and Iran, the growing irrelevance of the
mother tongues typifies the sorts of dislocations that arise
from the clash between modern and traditional societies.^
Although both countries have gone to some lengths to enhance
the use of Arabic and Farsi, fluency in French, English or
German is a prerequisite for elite status in either nation.
Exposure to Western languages, methods and values has gradu-
ally weakened the hold of traditional beliefs and customs.
Such developments have created ambivalent feelings among the
members of these changing societies. As much as aspiring
"moderns" admire Western methods and desire the Western
trappings of modernization, they can not help but resent
being born as strangers in their own lands, lands increas-
ingly dominated by the values of foreign cultures.
^While reliable figures are difficult to obtain.
Professor Marvin Zonis , author of The Political Elite of
Iran, states that more than half the population of Iran




The ensuing love-hate relationship with the West, a
product of structural dependence, manifests itself mpst
prominently on the national level in terms of foreign
policy. As will later be illustrated for both countries,
structural dependence has simultaneously bred acquiescence
and resistance. [Ref., 20: p. 8] Both the king and the shah
have made concessions to the center in order to raise stan-
dards of living, to satisfy short-term security requirements
or in the interests of development. On the other hand, both
have demonstrated a determination to resist the West when
conditions enabled them to chart an independent course based
on their own, not the center's socio-economic values. It
has been a common error of center nations to confuse a
temporary confluence of interests, or a tactical assumption
of the center's methods with voluntary assimilation of its
values [Ref. 17: p. 127]. As will be more fully discussed
later, it is possible that Morocco's "colonial" experience
made it more sensitive to the ultimate impossibility of
assimilation than was Iran.
2 . Impact on Legitimization
Both the psychological and real results of struc-
tural dependence complicate the problems associated with the
king's dilemma. Albert Memmi views cultural nationalism, as
manifested by pan-Arabism, pan-Islamicism and the movement
toward Arabicization
,
as a reaction to the negative myths
27
thrust upon the people of the Middle East by the dominant
powers. He notes that it has become de riguer in the Arab
world to assert differences with the West with a vengeance,
whether linguistic, cultural or religious. Unfortunately,
this has meant that colonialism's negative myths, relating
to the inferiority of Eastern culture, have merely been
replaced by equally inaccurate positive myths, as expressed
in the dogma of popular cultural nationalism. [Ref. 17: pp.
132-9]
Cultural nationalism, an expression of the periph-
ery's latent desire for independence, poses several problems
for modernizing rulers. To begin with, it often encourages
efforts in areas that are somewhat counter-productive.
Witness the difficulties caused by "Arabicization" of the
educational system. Arabic equivalents for most modern
technical terms did not exist and had to be invented.
Graduates of this system were so limited by their Arabic
education that unless they possessed fluency in a European
language, higher education was precluded.
Cultural nationalism also encourages forces that
impede the modernizing process (i.e., pan-Arabism,
pan-Islamicism) . As already discussed, a key to the modern-
izing process is the exchange of traditional commitments for
the values and aspirations of the modern world. The
pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic movements seek to reverse that
trend. Most serious, however, is the threat cultural
nationalism poses to modernizing rulers themselves.
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Cultural nationalism strives to overcome or at least
explain the economic and cultural weakness which persists. in
Islamic states when evaluated against Western standards.
One common reaction has been to find foreign scapegoats to
explain the Arab world's inability to solve its own problems
(i.e., America as the "great Satan"). For these reasons,
the appearance of independence is among the most important
public policy goals for the rulers of developing countries.
[Ref. 21: p. 41]
Reforming leaders in the Third World cannot afford
to become too closely identified with the center even though
they are absolutely dependent on its assistance for develop-
ment. It is essential that they maintain the apparent capa-
bility to make their own decisions, free of foreign
interference. Nehru alluded to the liabilities of alignment
when he declared at Bandung in 1956: "If I join any of
these big groups, I lose my identity: I have no identity
left, I have no views left." [Ref. 21: p. 42] The links
between the ruler, the nations 's identity and the perceived
ability to take independent action, therefore, are essential
elements of the ruler's legitimacy.
Both King Hassan and the shah looked to history as a
source of legitimacy by attempting to tie their regimes to
past glories, real or imagined. They attempted, with
differing degrees of success, to link a primordial national
heritage with goals of political modernity. Yet, the
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contradictory forces arising from the imperialist experience
and dependency have complicated and impeded this task.
On one hand, Western- influenced Arab reformers tend
to deplore the excesses of autocratic, monarchical rule (the
king's dilemma). On the other hand, they blame the failure
of Western parliamentary forms on their vulnerability to
manipulation by external powers. [Ref. 9: pp. 123-5] This
leaves rulers in the impossible position of trying to
achieve mutually exclusive objectives i.e., promoting the
agenda suggested by cultural nationalism while both satis-
fying national development needs and trying to placate the
center nations [Ref. 20: p. 8].
Heavy-handed Western diplomacy has often aggravated
the legitimacy problems facing modernizing rulers. Egyptian
public opinion following the assassination of Anwar Sadat
illustrates the deadly stigma associated with the perception
by the public of close identification with the West. As a
U.S. observer in Cairo reported:
Most important, intense popular feelings have been
directed against the Egyptian president who took in
America's Shah; who offered military facilities to the
U.S.; who did not protest American shelving of the West
Bank/Palestinian issue ;... Sadat seemed, to most
Egyptians, almost pathetically eager to proclaim his
loyalty to his U.S. ally... most Egyptians also felt that
Sadat had compromised Egypt's independence; that he had
made Egypt a toady of the United States. [Ref. 22: pp.
18-9]
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The case of the shah is another relevant example.
The perception, held by the Iranian people, that the shah
was an American hireling clearly undercut his legitimacy.
However in a region of the world where many Islamic funda-
mentalists increasingly oppose anything that smacks of
moderation let alone . Western penetration, even far less
extreme forms of cooperation with center nations encourage
domestic and international opposition. To growing numbers
of the radicalized intelligentsia, political modernity has
nothing to do with transforming the nation, it simply
camouflages the activities of the neo-colonialists and
promotes a class of local bourgeoisie that act as the West's
business agents. [Ref. 16: pp. 152-3]
The difficulties which confronted the Shah of Iran
and now confront King Hassan illustrate the link between
modernization and dependency. In both countries, modern
values and goods clearly raised expectations among previ-
ously quiescent segments of society. Both rulers exploited
this public mood to rally popular support for further
reform. Rising expectations, however, can be a two-edged
sword. If left unfulfilled, they breed frustration and
ultimately contribute to regime threatening instability.
Since neither Iran nor Morocco can meet the modern
needs of their populations without external assistance,
continued progress toward modernity is related to mainte-
nance of center-periphery relationships. Unfortunately for
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reforming rulers, the perception of dependence on external
powers undercuts an important source of legitimacy- -their
"independence." In this way, dependence aggravates the
already serious problems the "king's dilemma" presents for
modernizing rulers.
King Hassan f.aces many of the problems related to
modernization and dependency which combined to defeat the
shah. In the next chapter, we will explore the changing
environment, characterized by conflicting societal percep-
tions and increasing evidence of civil unrest, in which the
Shah of Iran tried to modernize a traditional Islamic
society. A key element in the shah's fall was his failure
to find the proper balance between his critical need for
external assistance and the adverse consequences of
accepting it. The shah's failure in Iran will serve as the
baseline by which we can evaluate Hassan's progress toward
modernizing Morocco. The intention is not to merely show
that Morocco is not Iran. To accurately assess King
Hassan's prospects, this thesis must answer the question of




Until 1978, the Shah of Iran had been regarded as one of
the world's richest and most powerful monarchs . His goal
was to transform Iran .into a progressive, modern, industri-
alized nation before its oil resources were depleted
[Ref. 23: p.'^]. He appeared resolute in his determination
to achieve that goal, speaking of a future in which Iran
would become the "fifth industrial nation of the world
[Ref. 24: p. 98]. There seemed no limit to the shah's gran-
diose plans, yet as the events of 1978 would prove, many of
the shah's dreams were fantasies.
The shah, never truly aware of the magnitude or strength
of his opposition, was astonished by the riots, demonstra-
tions and strikes which beset his rule from the summer of
1978 onward. By the end of the year, his power base had
almost vanished. When he perceived that even the United
States would no longer support him, he felt he had no choice
but to leave his country for a "temporary vacation" abroad.
This time there would be no CIA counter- coup to bring the
shah back to power.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National
Security Advisor, admits the Carter administration consis-
tently sent contradictory signals to the shah that actually
exacerbated his decline. It was, he says, an "intellectual
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misjudgment of a central historical reality", a failure to
understand
that rapid modernization of a very traditional society
breeds its own instabilities and revolutionary dynamics,
that it requires a political system that can gradually
enlarge political participation while providing safety
valves for social dissatisfaction, that old religious
beliefs should not be uprooted without gradual public
acceptance of more modern values, including some genuine
connection with the past. [Ref. 25: p. 397]
Brzezinski also assigns importance to such idiosyncratic
factors as the shah's illness, his tendency toward indeci-
sion, and the impact of American policy on a basically weak
personality. He concludes that once it became clear that
the shah lacked the personal will and toughness to assert
his power, U.S. policy became virtually irrelevant.
[Ref. 25: pp. 395-7]
One who writes from an entirely different political
perspective, Fereydoun Hoveyda, also agrees that in the end
the shah was really the architect of his own defeat."
[Ref. 26: p. 85] Although Hoveyda, Brzezinski and other
observers of the Iranian Revolution would assign different
priorities to the variables which led to the shah's down-
fall, everyone's list seems to include factors which fit the
''Hoveyda is the brother of Amir Abass Hoveyda, the
Iranian Prime Minister from 1965-76. He was imprisoned
toward the end of the shah's reign and executed by the
fundamentalists after his fall. Hoveyda harbors a bitter,




1. Domestic factors (power base, social mobilization,
political participation)




Within these categories one discovers a textbook example of
the confrontation between modern and traditional forces.
The shah, by his manipulation of social, political and
economic processes, unleashed forces opposed to those his
throne required to maintain its centrality in politics. The
result stands as a classic example of the destructive poten-
tial of the "king's dilemma." These forces had their most
immediate impact on a factor absolutely critical to the
crown's legitimacy: the sources of its domestic support
A. DOMESTIC FACTORS
1. Power Base
Monarchs normally- build their constituency on the
traditional power holders: landed aristocracy, the merchant
elite, the clerical establishment and local notables
[Ref. 9: p. 26]. In addition, the modernizing monarch can
draw support from the state bureaucracy, the middle class,
the masses and even foreign governments [Ref. 8: p. 28].
The loyalty of these sources of power to the shah's throne
was in doubt from the very start of the young king's reign.
35
Intense foreign interference and the humiliating
circumstances of his father's abdication increased nation-
alist opposition to his rule. In addition, the shah lacked
such basic rationalizations as charisma and religion to
lend legitimacy to his crown. It was only after the deposi-
tion of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 that the shah even
began to rule his realm. Prior to his CIA-assisted return
to the throne, his role had been merely to reign. After
1953, the shah was forced to quickly master the art of
divide and rule in order to control his opposition.
[Ref. 27: p. 199]
Over the next decade, the shah took steps to affirm
his authority over every aspect of the Iranian government by
declaring martial law and completely overriding the Iranian
Majlis. By 1963, with the country firmly under his control,
the shah introduced his program of reform and development
known as the "White Revolution." The revolution seemed to
have the nation's support as open incidents of opposition
became less frequent.
In 1967, 26 years after his accession to the throne,
the shah's royal legitimacy was formally proclaimed at a
grandiose coronation ceremony rumored to have cost the
country millions and attended by an impressive collection of
dignitaries. This "historic " event was in tune with the
spectacular rate of economic and social development that
Iran enjoyed from 1963 to 1973. Yet during this decade of
36
relentless modernization, growing inequalities between
Iran's classes were adding to the reservoir of traditional
resentment quietly held by many toward the shah's policies.
[Ref. 28: pp. 62-6]
The giant increase in oil revenues in 1973 increased
the disparities between the various segments of Iranian
society. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear
that from 1973 onward the shah's power base began to
crumble. By the autumn of 1978, the shah's base had
narrowed to portions of the state bureaucracy (primarily the
military) and a rapidly dwindling number of notables. The
coalition of groups united in their determination to destroy
the shah and the trappings of the monarchy cut across the
rest of Iranian society: Shiite religious leaders, tribal
minorities, bureaucrats, bazaar merchants, students, profes-
sionals, intellectuals, communists, liberals, laborers,
peasants, sophisticated urbanites, and conservative
agrarians [Ref. 29: p. 166-7].
One group that was ready to exploit the growing
dissatisfaction with the- shah's policies was the clergy.
From the beginning, they had resented the Pahlavis' attempts
to glorify the monarchy. From their perspective, the
Pahlavi- inspired monarchical ideology-mythology devalued
Islam. For example, the shah's attempt at his coronation to
impose the Persian calendar, dating from Cyrus the Great
rather than from the Prophet's "hejira", seemed an attempt
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by the monarchy to supersede Iran's Islamic traditions.
[Ref . 30: p. 241] . -
The ulama's hatred for the shah also stemmed from a
number of concrete grievances. They bitterly resented the
shah's modernization program, because it deprived them of
their old religious estates, as well as the fact that the
shah's civil rights reforms removed their power over the
judiciary. In addition, the regime had unsuccessfully to
cut government subsidies to the ulama in the mid 1970s.
By 1976, Islamic fundamentalism, manifested in the
form of large scale demonstrations, was openly challenging
the existing order. Because of the Shia clergy's relative
financial independence from the state, the shah had little
leverage over their activities. [Ref. 24: p. 84] His uncer-
tain application of repressive measures, followed by
attempts at appeasement, seemed only to increase the
mullahs' contempt for his regime.
The shah's reforms also threatened traditional busi-
ness interests in the bazaar. Despite the modernization of
the economy, the bazaar still accounted for 30 percent of
all imports and two-thirds of domestic trade. With bazaari
access to foreign exchange, through carpets, nuts and dried
fruits, their lending power accounted for 15 percent of
private sector [Ref. 30: pp. 245-6]
The new Western banking system superseded the
lending monopolies the bazaaris had long profited from. The
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traditional system had allowed them to provide money at
relatively usurious rates. In addition, the shah's plans
provided for new commercial and shopping districts that
would result in parts of the bazaar being torn down. This
was part of a government plan to reduce bazaari power by
building new streets, shops, schools and institutions,
making it easier to control distribution and cut down on
"profiteering." The traditional merchant class was also
offended by the general secularization of Iranian society.
Thus, for a combination of religious and material reasons,
this group, once part of the shah's natural constituency,
also began to openly oppose his rule. [Ref. 30: pp. 245-6]
Most foreign observers agreed that the military was
the one group likely to remain a potent force in support of
the shah's regime until the bitter end. By the autumn of
1978, conditions in Iran had so deteriorated that the
regime's only hope of survival seemed to lie with the army.
However, the decisive military action which might have saved
the shah was not forthcoming. The growing revolution
revealed some serious shortcomings in the professional mili-
tary which had been less apparent when the shah's powers
were at their peak.
As a result of the shah's success in centralizing
all power in the palace, his army lacked the unified command
structure required for independent action. The shah had
little confidence in his generals and lacked tough military
39
advisors willing to tell him it was "time to pull the
trigger." [Ref. 31: p. 85] When the shah finally appointed
a military government in November of 1978, its relative
moderation extended the general perception of the ruling
elites' weakness to the military. The shah, for reasons
which will be discussed later, was unwilling to give his
generals permission to employ an "iron fist" strategy
against the growing crowds of dissidents. His generals,
having built careers based on close cooperation with and
support from the United States, were convinced that even if
the shah failed to command it, America would eventually ask
them to act. American signals, as we know, were hopelessly
confused.
In the meantime, the religious leaders continued to
infiltrate and coopt the lower levels of the shah's army,
particularly the soldiers who had been in the streets facing
the chanting crowds and listening to the sermons of the
mullahs. By the end of the year, the military's potential
to head off the revolution had disappeared. [Ref. 32: pp.
23-30] Khomeini had succeeded in separating the men from the
officers, effectively disarming the shah's army before a
battle could take place [Ref. 24: p. 146].
2 . Social Mobilization
The process of chipping away at the basis for the
shah's support had begun with the "White Revolution" in
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1963.^ Paradoxically, the shah initiated this program of
reforms at Washington's behest because of the Kennedy-
Administration's concern for the narrowness of his power
base. They were an attempt to build popular support in a
deteriorating political situation. To the shah, the success
of the revolution seemed assured by the overwhelming support
given to his six point referendum, held in January 1963. In
fact, the reforms marked the end of Western- style parliamen-
tary monarchy in Iran and the beginning of absolute
monarchy. [Ref. 12: p. 71]
Although the land reform provisions of the "White
Revolution" assured Washington of the shah's commitment to
"equity and social justice", they cost the shah the support
of the traditional landlords and alienated portions of the
clergy which held large religious estates. [Ref. 23: p. 77]
On the other hand, the shah succeeded in separating the
landlords from the 70 percent of the Iranian population they
had previously controlled. The land reforms thus added a
new peasant-based potential source of support for the shah's
regime. [Ref. 23: p. 85]
^The six points embodied in the "White Revolution" were:
(i) abolition of the landlord-serf relationship; (ii)
nationalization of the forests; (iii) amendment of the
election laws, including the enfranchisement of women; (iv)
sale of government factories to pay for land reform; (v)
approval of workers sharing company profits; (vi) establish-
ment of a literacy corps to facilitate compulsory education.
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However, other effects of the "White Revolution"
negated the benefits flowing from this new base of rural
support. Many of the peasants who had been excluded from
the redistribution process chose to become urban rather than
rural workers. In addition, many of the redistributed
parcels of land were . too small to be farmed efficiently.
The government had neither the bureaucratic machinery nor
the agricultural expertise necessary to replace the large
landowners. Nor was it willing to commit the financial
resources necessary to facilitate such a transition. Thus,
the owners of the small plots often sold them off to larger
owners and moved to the cities as well. Finally, the chil-
dren of the remaining prosperous farmers preferred the
excitement of urban life to the drab rural existence.
[Ref. 5: p. 56]
As a result of these various factors, total agricul-
tural production gradually fell in the years following the
"White Revolution." Iran went from virtual agricultural
self-sufficiency in the late 1960s to a position as one of
the world's largest food importers, with nearly $2 billion
in agricultural imports, by 1976 [Ref. 5: p. 219]. Of
course, changing tastes brought about by prosperity was
another important factor explaining the increased demand for
imported food products. Nonetheless, an unwanted result of
the land reform process was that decreased local agricul-
tural productivity added to the rural exodus to the cities.
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The long-term political consequence of land reforms, there-
fore, was an increasingly volatile situation in the cities,
in which the bonds between the masses and the crown were
finally broken.
Due to the massive demographic flow from the hinter-
lands, the urban population had quadrupled between 1956 and
the end of the 1970s. Urban services had grown accordingly,
but were becoming less effective due to an increasingly
bloated bureaucracy. Eventually, city administrations were
unable to provide even the most fundamental level of sani-
tary or civil services for the exploding urban masses.
Unemployment, underemployment, inflation and the highly
visible spending habits of Iran's "nouveau riche" elites
heightened the antipathy the majority of the urban classes
felt for the government bureaucracy. [Ref. 32: p. 9] Only
partially modernized, the residual traditional values of the
urban masses made the cities fertile ground for the seeds of
religious passion sown by the mullahs.
One of the documents found after the revolution was
a memorandum, presumed to have been written by the CIA,
recommending a set of guidelines for the shah to pursue
after his return to power in 1953. The document suggested
that the shah attempt to expand the middle class. A large
middle class, with a more secular outlook, would be less
susceptible to the old traditional appeals and form a
natural foundation for his regime. [Ref. 24: p. 67]
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The shah followed this blueprint carefully. His
modernization programs provided for the education of tens of
thousands of Iranians abroad. Yet this effort failed to add
substantially to his regime's support. Between 1950 and
1968, a total of 325,731 students were sent to other coun-
tries; only 22,681 af them returned to Iran [Ref. 11: p.
150] . Of those who did return, most were thoroughly incul-
cated with Western ideals and methods. Once in Iran,
however, many found they were forced to accept positions
below their expectations.
3 . Political Participation
To provide a political outlet for their frustra-
tions, the shah created the "Rastakhiz" (Renaissance) Party
in 1975. Once it became apparent that this step toward
democratization would lead to challenges to the shah's
power, he imposed severe limitations on the party's ability
to take independent political action. [Ref. 32: pp. 9-10] In
the shah's view these measures were required to compensate
for the basic weakness of oriental society. He believed the
people were weak and could only be guided by a firm,
exacting hand. [Ref. 24: p. 70]
It is true that the peasantry, whose recent migra-
tion accounted for most of the urban working class, was
politically immature. The shah was able to keep the discon-
tent of Iran's more sophisticated citizens at a low simmer
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by the association of his regime with the undeniable
material benefits of Iran's initial economic progress.
However, eventually the absence of political safety
valves combined with the economic slowdown to boil over in
more serious and visible forms of dissatisfaction.
[Ref. 11: p. 144-5]. The shah's political system remained
unchanged although the rest of Iranian society had been
transformed. The nation had evolved into a multi-cultured
society, but the shah was unwilling to let the people modify
the old unitary set of rules . ^ This inflexibility alienated
growing numbers of students, intellectuals and members of
the middle class who had initially embraced modernization
with enthusiasm.
B. THE ROLE OF. ISLAM
1. Legitimizing Influence
The shah's attempts to use religion as a legitim-
izing device were largely unsuccessful. He was forced to
compete with the muj tabid who in Shia Islam represent the
"hidden Imam." Lacking a traditional, doctrinal link with
the almighty, the shah attempted to emphasize his special
relationship with divinity, occasionally referring to
^Dr. A. Afghani, in a lecture presented at the Naval
Postgraduate School, 28 November 1984. Dr. Afghani was a
member of the faculty of the National University in Tehran
during the period in question.
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himself as the "shadow of God." He often stated that he
felt "there was some supreme being who is guiding me" and
credited his numerous personal escapes from assassination
and political disasters to "some unseen hand." [Ref. 27: p.
209]
By the onset of the revolution, Iranians apparently
saw little evidence of God's hand in the repression and
injustices of the shah's regime. Some of the slogans
shouted by the diverse groups united under the banner of
Islam were: "Down with the shah and his oppressive regime";
and "Long live Khomeini, democracy, freedom and equality."
[Ref. 23: p. 194] To the shah, such slogans confirmed his
conviction that his opposition was an "unholy alliance of
red and black", a destructive union of anti-West communists
and religious zealots [Ref. 1: p. 162].
In fact, the slogans indicate how effectively the
clergy was able to coopt democratic ideals as well as entice
moderate segments of Iranian society to join in opposition
that in the end served primarily the clergy's interests. As
previously discussed, opposition to the shah was not limited
to the "red and black" but cut across Iranian society and
included elites and liberals as well as leftists and
bazaaris. The clergy, however, was the crucial element,
serving both as facilitator through the mosques, and as the
glue that held the diverse groups together.
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2. Opposition to the Shah
The clergy's reasons for its total opposition to the
shah went beyond the loss of land, revenues and judicial
power which resulted from the White Revolution. Its opposi-
tion stemmed from the process of modernization itself.
Modernization threatened the very basis for the ulama's
existence by its challenge to the fundamental prescriptions
of the Quran. [Ref. 33: p. 183] Khomeni ' s medieval views of
the corrupting influence of modern civilization, secular
values and Western civilization were apparent in his address
to the faithful on the last day of Ramadan in 1980.
When democrats talk about freedom, they are inspired by
the superpowers. They want to lead our youth to places
of corruption. ... If that is what they want, than yes, we
are reactionaries. You who want prostitution and
freedom want to have freedom to have bars, brothels, and
opium. But we want our youth to carve out a new period
in history. We do not want intellectuals. [Ref. 34: p.
82]
One explanation for the mullahs' dominant role in
the revolution was simply that no other major independent
institution had survived the shah's attempts to centralize
all authority in the crown. Since the shah and Savak had
suppressed all meaningful political activity, only Islam
remained as a viable alternative to the regime. This expla-
nation accurately describes the mosques' important organiza-
tional function as a channel for the peoples' discontent but
does not fully explain the role of Islam. It fails to
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adequately emphasize the fact that much of the basis for
that discontent was the depth of the average Iranian's
attachment to Islam and his responsiveness to appeals
couched in Islamic terms. [Ref. 35: p. 189] The mullahs
provided the disparate groups with a common ideology and
provided the infrastructure needed to coordinate the
protests for maximum impact. [Ref. 36: pp. 98-9]
Shiism was a particularly effective vehicle for
revolution in the Iranian context because of its opposi-
tional nature, its stress on self-sacrifice, and the concept
of sanctuary ("bast" or inviolability of the mosque). Even
more important was the basic tenet that no temporal
authority may be conceded prior to the reappearance of
the"Mahdi" (Hidden Imam). [Ref. 36: p. 101] This left the
Shiite ulama, who derive their legitimacy from the "Mahdi",
relatively independent of temporal rule. In the absence of
the Hidden Imam, Shiite jurisprudence calls for the ulama to
perform his function. Thus, apart from the Sharia itself,
the consensus of the ulama is the best guide which mortals
can follow. This argument obviously gave the Shiite ulama a
superior tactical position from which to launch a
revolution. [Ref. 37: p. 34]
The odd coalition of liberal elites, dissatisfied
bourgeoisie, leftists and bazaaris thought the mullahs would
recede from political life once the shah was removed. The
secular groups never understood the degree to which the
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mullahs facilitated the revolution. Although foreign
observers were certain the revolution's strength came from
the elites and the liberal middle class, the mullahs easily
overpowered their secular supporters once the revolution was
established.
The core of the revolution's strength was actually
the link between the urban masses and the religious element.
Paradoxically, modern conditions in the form of urbanization
and ease of communication had helped the mullahs to organize
a revolt without the support of the hard- to-mobilize rural
masses. The rioting crowds of new urban immigrants saw the
shah in Islamic terms as "Yazid, murderer of Hussein."
[Ref. 38: p. 43.] In the chaotic aftermath of the revolu-
tion, the secular groups learned to their dismay that they
had needed Khomeini far more than he needed them.
C. LEADERSHIP FACTORS
1. Will and Personality
As events indicated, the shah no longer had the will
to apply power as ruthlessly as would have been necessary to
reverse the direction or momentum of events in 1978. As
early as 1947, U.S. Ambassador George Allen had noted the
shah's -tendency to resist using his dictatorial powers to
control domestic unrest [Ref. 2: p. 11]. More recently,
Ambassador Sullivan had observed that the shah did not seem
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to be the type of "hard-nosed" individual well cast to lead
in time of crisis [Ref. 39: p. 11]. It could be argued that
"hard-nosed" measures would have clashed with the shah's
natural inclination toward liberalization. He seemed to
want nothing so much as to gradually withdraw and someday
abdicate in favor of his son. In his own words:
A sovereign may not save his throne by shedding his
countrymen's blood. A dictator can, for he acts in the
name of ideology and believes it must triumph no matter
what the cost. But a sovereign is not a dictator. He
can not break the alliance that exists between him and
his people. A dictator has nothing to bestow for power
resides in him alone. A sovereign is given a crown and
must bequeath it to the next generation. [Ref. 1: p.
167]
Unfortunately, the timing of the liberalization that
was forced upon him was wrong. Given the characteristic
Iranian suspicion of acts of accommodation, every reform was
seen as a concession made under pressure. Such little
"surrenders" earned for the shah only increased contempt.
In Iran's culture, opposition elements typically assess
amicable treatment as an indication of weakness [Ref. 11: p.
118] .
Increasingly, the shah withdrew from reality,
protected by a bodyguard of syncophants and seemingly para-
lysed by indecision. [Ref. 36: p. 95] If no one ever dared
lie to Reza Shah, now just the opposite was true. No one
dared tell his son the truth. Flattery had become one of
the tools of survival in Iran. With the possible exception
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of North Korea's Kim il Sung, no world leader encouraged
flattery to the extent as did the Shah of Iran. In a manner
consistent with the Shiite concept of "taquiya", Iranians
chose to "tell Caesar what he wanted to hear", rather than
render to him what was his. [Ref. 38: p. 2].
During the year preceding the revolution, there was
one terrifying piece of the truth, known only by the shah,
which in retrospect partly explains his seeming listlessness
and fatalistic attitude during the critical summer and
autumn months of 1978. French doctors, who examined the
shah early in 1978, informed him that he was terminally ill
with cancer and that the disease would gradually impair his
reactions and decision-making ability. Although the shah
eventually shared the burden of this knowledge with his
wife, it was never known by the United States government or
the shah's opposition. The hidden effects of the shah's
fatal disease made his failure to act that much more incom-
prehensible to both his allies and his foes. [Ref. 11: p.
204]
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal, who met with the shah
in November 1978, was shocked by the shah's apparent depres-
sion. He reported to Ambassador Sullivan that he "saw no
prospect that a man in such a mood could attain the resolve
to take political or other forceful actions necessary to
preserve his authority." [Ref. 39: p. 196] Prime Minister
Azhari told Sullivan that he did not think he could carry on
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any longer because of the shah's indecision and unwilling-
ness to use force [Ref. 24: p. 161]. U.S. policies were not
helpful in this respect. The Carter Administration
continued to send mixed signals up to the day the shah
finally left the country. At any rate, the shah's paralysis
of will and vacillation in time of crisis, whether due to a
basic character flaw, or induced by his private knowledge of
the seriousness of his illness, had a tragic impact on the
final outcome.
2 . Cultural Schizophrenia
The shah's growing material dependence on the U.S.
was probably not nearly as significant as his growing
psychological dependence. His dependence was of the ambiva-
lent nature discussed in Chapter II. As a youth, the shah
was educated with the sons of wealthy Europeans and other
top Iranian officials at the exclusive Le Posey school in
Switzerland. While his European education rid him of Reza
Shah's provincialism and created within him an admiration
for Western culture, technology and institutions, it also
created a chauvinistic attachment to the values and tradi-
tions of Iran.
"Cultural schizophrenia", stemming from these early
experiences, might best describe the differences between the
shah's style of leadership and that which marked the reign
of his father. In a strange way, the shah tried to make
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Iran's traditional conventions conform to the criteria of
Western liberalism. For example, on a number of public
occasions, he tried to justify authoritarian measures or
explain the necessity of the monarchy to his people- -signs
of personal insecurity never exhibited by Reza Shah or any
other Iranian monarch. [Ref. 12: p. 58-9]
In the months immediately prior to the revolution,
the shah's use of the "Western yardstick" placed impossible
constraints on his ability to salvage the rapidly
deteriorating situation. Brzezinski was perhaps the first
member of the Carter Administration to understand the impli-
cations of the shah's need for constant reassurance from the
U.S. He warned against policies which might be perceived by
the shah as signalling the end of American support for his
regime. [Ref. 25: p. 377]
Brzezinski was convinced the administration's
constant human rights refrain not only embarrassed the shah,
but weakened him by relentlessly pressing him to make
concessions to his opponents. Brzezinski advocated taking a
hard line. He promoted the theories of historian Crane
Brinton, who had observed that successful revolutions were
rarities. Determined leadership, through a timely combina-
tion of repression and concession invariably was able to
disarm its opposition. [Ref. 25: p. 355]
This was the prescription successfully adhered to by
the shah following Mossadegh's fall and in the upheaval over
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the White Revolution. On both of these occasions, the shah
had cracked down hard, convincing the uncommitted of the
hopelessness of dissent. This time the shah hesitated to
use his coercive powers. Those in the middle sensed the
hopelessness of the shah's position and cast their lot with
the revolution. [Ref.. 11: p. 205]
D. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Future shock was considered virtuous, the goal of
rational modernization to be pressed forward ruthlessly
by means of science, technology, planning and despotic
authority. No element of tradition, no personal desire,
no aesthetic value, no religious qualm, no philosophic
hesitancy was to stand in the way.... the extent of the
opposition to the shah was not primarily because of his
repressive treatment of the opposition, but because of
the outrageous simplemindedness of his modernization
programs which attacked the quiescent and made political
activists of them. [Ref. 5: p. 58]
1. Years of Boom
The accuracy of the preceding comments by Leonard
Binder demonstrates the advantages of hindsight. At the
time however, the shah's program of rapid economic develop-
ment was almost universally hailed. His economic achieve-
ments in the 1960s and 1970s were particularly impressive.
Per capita income had increased from $300 to $2200. More
than 65 percent of the population owned the houses they
lived in. Literacy had improved from only 15 to 50 percent.
Primary school attendance was up from 270,000 to over 10
million.
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It should, however, be noted that the most signifi-
cant progress was made before 1973. After that date, prob-
lems arising from the shah's belief in quick easy
development began to surface. The quantum leap in oil
revenues, rather than spurring even greater development, led
to grandiose schemes and excesses that finally brought
Iran's development to a halt. Symptomatic indications that
Iran's economy was headed for a final crash were: overcon-
centration of power and wealth, luxury centered consumption,
pervasive corruption, excessive military expenditures,
rising food imports and a general lack of sound analysis by
the shah's advisors. [Ref. 11: p. 145]
The abundance of oil-generated money encouraged the
shah to begin a spending spree that exceeded the Iranian
economy's "absorptive capability [Ref. 5: p. 121]. The
executives of 25 major firms doing business in Iran bluntly
informed American Ambassador William Sullivan that
Iran's chances of shifting to a broad-based economy were
small, that part of the problem was the shah's insis-
tence on acquiring the latest in 'gold plated tech-
nology, both military and industrial equipment', that he
was neglecting his agricultural center, and that the
shah was an megalomaniac. [Ref. 31: p. 81]
Sullivan himself harbored doubts about the ability of
Iranian, labor to respond to the shah's massive program of
industrialization [Ref. 39: pp. 30-1]. In his previous
assignment as Ambassador to the Philippines, he had become
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sensitized to the impact of capital-labor disparities
(although in the Philippines the mismatch was reversed). .
2 . The Economic Crash
Inflation, in the wake of and as a direct result of
the shah's spree, averaged 30 to 50 percent. The unprece-
dented expansion of government expenditures increased
liquidity and effective demand. Yet, as Ambassador Sullivan
noted, Iranian infrastructure was inadequate to absorb
resources at an acceptable rate of return. The supply of
domestic goods simply could not increase at the same rate as
demand, especially in the construction and housing indus-
tries. [Ref. 5: p. 222-43] The unfortunate fact was that
most of the cities' newer inhabitants could not adjust their
personal incomes to keep up with rising prices.
Rentals were uncontrolled and by 1975 accounted for
30 to 60 percent of most urban workers' wages. The resul-
tant pressure on wages explains the 35 to 45 percent
increase in wages over the same period. By 1976, land
prices in urban areas had risen by 78 percent. [Ref. 5: p.
214-5] A new class of "nouveau riche" appeared, ready to
cash in on this 20th century "gold rush." [Ref. 40: p. 224]
Even though almost every Iranian was better off than 20
years before, the gap between rich and poor had widened and
became the focus of economic discontent. The conspicuous
consumption of the new money class created resentment among
the urban masses and the bazaaris.
56
Corruption also touched the shah, if not directly,
then at least through his family. They seemed to treat Iran
as if it were their private property, routinely engaging in
the most outrageous excesses. By way of illustration, in
1976 the U.S. Treasury reported the decline of Iran's inves-
tible surplus from $10.7 billion in 1974 to $4.5 billion in
1976. On the very day that report was published, Empress
Farah was returning from Paris, having just purchased three
tons of rose marble for the royal family's new swimming
pool. [Ref. 11: p. 156] By 1979, the royal family and the
Pahlavi foundation controlled 80 percent of the cement
industry in Iran, 70 percent of the hotels and tourism, 62
percent of banking and insurance, 40 percent of the textile
industry and 35 percent of the motor industry. [Ref. 24: p.
95]
The shah's attempts to crack down on corruption just
made matters worse by undermining his relationships with
various segments of his political base. Most public offi-
cials resisted suggestions to slow down the pace of Iran's
development, not wanting to forego the opportunities for
personal enrichment it presented. The shah's anti-
profiteering campaign failed to touch these sources of high
level corruption or those who controlled the country's oil
wealth. The anti-profiteering campaign merely resulted in
the arrest of 7,500 merchants and the fining of 10,000 more,
clearly alienating the bazaaris and cementing their alliance
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with the mullahs against the shah. [Ref. 11: p. 156]
Although the shah considered himself above corruptijDn,
Iranian citizens perceived a clear connection between the
shah and the corruption that riddled his regime.
Khomeini was able to depict the shah as the personi-
fication of corruption. He exploited the seeds of distrust
and resentment government policies had sowed among the
bazaaris and other strata of Iranian society. His brand of
Shiism, with its emphasis on social justice, took full
advantage of the people's growing distaste for the injustice
inherent in the shah's regime. The sudden great wealth that
had once encouraged the shah to aspire to be the world's
"fifth industrial nation" also created the inequalities and
alarm that led to revolution. [Ref. 34: p. 401]
E. FOREIGN DEPENDENCE
1. Myth of Independence
Iran's traditional monarchy, which could claim 2500
years of continuous existence, seemed to have a headstart
toward modernization in the post-war era. Its well estab-
lished institutions of national authority, when compared to
those of other developing countries, gave it a clear advan-
tage in the face of the challenges presented by rapid
social, political and economic change. By virtue of having
avoided status as a colony of an imperial power, Iran was
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able to perpetuate the myth of Iranian independence. As
previously discussed, Iran's freedom from direct colonial
administration was primarily due to the circumstances of
Anglo-Russian imperial competition which allowed the indige-
nous monarchy to retain its independence. [Ref. 8: p.
152-3] Nontheless, .Iranians belief in ther country's
"unique" ability to avoid control by foreign powers contrib-
uted to a sense of national pride, certainly a key element
in the shah's early successes at "nation-building."
[Ref. 41: p. 203]
Iran's myth of independence, however, had some
unfortunate impacts on its development and on its people.
In the first place, Iran did not have colonial models of
bureaucracy and administration to rely on during its devel-
opment process. Even more significantly, Iran never experi-
enced the unifying benefits that the struggle for
independence against a palpable enemy provided many other
nations, including Morocco. With the tangible symbols of
the enemy's direct control absent, Iranians could tended to
reach cynical conclusions about the origins of the obvious
influence held by various foreign powers over domestic
events in Iran. [Ref. 41: p. 204-5]
2
. Xenophobia
This led to the Iranian "ab zire kah" conception of
politics. Everyone and everything was assumed to have a
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price. All members of the political elite were seen as
corrupt and more loyal to foreign powers than to their own
country. Even during the shah's heyday there was a tendency
to classify Iranian politicians as pro-German, pro-Russian,
pro-French, pro-American, etc. The system of indirect colo-
nialism further fed Iranians' naturally strong xenophobic
tendencies. Since the system made it very difficult to
determine who was responsible for anything in Iran, Iranians
found it too easy to simply blame foreigners for everything.
This feature of Iran's "colonial legacy", which was still
operating on the political scene in the pre-revolutionary
Iran of the 1970s, further compounded the "king's dilemma"
for the shah. [Ref. 41: p. 205]
Xenophobia is a strong political weapon that the
shah, due to his close identification with foreign powers,
sought to avoid. Mossadegh used it with success during the
nationalization period of the early 1950s. Khomeini, as we
have recently observed, wielded it with great effect to
inflame anti-American passions against the shah in 1978.
America's transformation in Iranian eyes from savior to
satan can best be understood in the context of Iranian
history which in turn partially explains the nation's
strange and paranoic character. [Ref. 30: p. 276]
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3 . The American Connection
One obvious symbol of the changes wrought by the
shah on Iranian society was the physical presence of a large
foreign community. The Americans, by far the most visible
of the foreign groups, numbered 45,000 in Tehran alone by
1979 [Ref. 2: pp. 31-3]. The extent of the foreign presence
stoked the traditional xenophobia of many Iranians. The
shah, who had needed American help to wrest power from
Mossadegh in 1953, never broke away from the associations
formed by his regime's initial dependence on foreign inter-
vention. In the eyes of his people, he was closely identi-
fied with the United States and was even suspected by many
of being an American "agent." [Ref. 23: p. 204]
Even Iran's economic power, following the 1973
Middle East War, was not enough to bring symmetry to
U.S. -Iranian relations. Oil revenues transformed the
country into a capital surplus, skilled labor deficient,
unskilled labor abundant country. The shah squandered the
economic largess on an unrealistic, over-ambitious course of
militarization and industrialization that greatly exceeded
the country's non-capital resources. [Ref. 5: p. 122] This
made him even more dependent on the United States for the
high-tech equipment, the expertise and the trained personnel
needed to implement his programs. [Ref. 23: pp. 205-5]
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Further dependence led to increased tensions between
Iran and the United States. The 1964 extraterritoriality
agreement, which applied to American workers in Iran, was
also offensive to many Iranians. They saw the special legal
status of American workers as demeaning to both Islamic and
Iranian jurisprudence. In addition, Iranians resisted
American suggestions that they slow the pace of their devel-
opment. They felt simultaneously cheated and insulted when
they could not operate the new technology without American
assistance. [Ref. 11: p. 136]
Under the Nixon Doctrine, the shah became one of the
"twin pillars" in America's strategy for the stability of
the Persian Gulf. The United States supported the shah's
economic policies, and until 1977, met every arms sales
request without delay. Although the nature of the regime's
dependence of the United States had changed; it was now
dependent on U.S. support for the success of its programs,
not regime survival; the degree of dependence was greater
than ever.
For many Iranians , the growing American influence in
administration, economy, the armed forces and social
services reinforced the idea that the shah was an American
puppet. They believed he had sold out their country and
that Iranian resources were being exploited for the benefit
of foreigners. It seemed that Iranian cultural identity,
beliefs and values were being sacrificed in the name of the
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shah's extravagant visions for their future. V. S. Naipul
has collected and condensed the Iranian "man on the street
view" as follows:
When the shah ruled, everything in Iran had been for
him. He had drained the country of billions; he had
allowed the country to be plundered by foreign compa-
nies; he had filled the country with foreign advisors
and technicians. These foreigners got huge salaries and
lived in big houses; the Americans even had their own
television service. The people of Iran felt they had
lost their country. And the shah never really cared for
religion, the precious Shia faith. [Ref. 34: p. 28]
The American involvement was so visible and so
pervasive that it was easy to associate it with the regime's
abuses. The degree of American support for some of the
shah's over-ambitious plans now appears to have been in
neither country's interests. In the final analysis,
however, it was the shah, not America, who was responsible
for failure of his own policies. Even in the final months
of his reign, American policy makers failed to understand
the extent of the shah's decision-making constraints. U.S.
officials were telling the shah, quite appropriately, that
he had America's support, but that it was he who must make
his country's decisions. Given his need to appear to act
independently, this seemed like logical advice. [Ref. 11:
p. 210] The problem was that the shah had already lost most
of his options. He had relied so long on external support
as a substitute for domestic consent that it was now too
late to either coopt his opposition or to crush it.
[Ref. 42: p. 215]
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F. INTERIM SUMMARY
Recalling Huntington's theories regarding the "king's
dilemma", it's clear that the shah chose to modernize by
making himself the chief force behind the social mobiliza-
tion process. An organizational diagram of the bureaucratic
apparatus the shah created to implement his programs would
resemble a pyramid, with the shah at the pinnacle. The
weakness of this scheme was revealed when the man at the top
was removed. The subordinate organizations simply ceased to
function. Nonetheless, the shah's bureaucracy made aston-
ishing gains in upgrading the economic, cultural and social
attainment levels of the Iranian people, particularly from
1963 to 1973. 1973 was a critical year because it was at
this point that, the shah tried to use Iran's new abundance
of oil-generated revenues to circumvent the "king's
dilemma."
In retrospect, this is when the timing would have been
right to initiate a program of political reforms and
decrease the rate of economic growth. It is clear that the
shah had little feel for the inflationary impacts or balance
of payments implications of his "stabilization" policy after
the 1973 oil price hikes. The regime should have clarified
its economic goals and focused more on shorter run stabili-
zation issues. [Ref. 5: p. 246] Instead, the shah plunged
into an ad hoc program of industrialization and military
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spending that greatly increased the rate of inflation and
turned growing numbers of Iranians from all social strata
against the regime.
The obvious inequalities created by the shah's spending
spree played right into the hands of his traditional opposi-
tion, who opposed the shah's modernization programs for a
variety of religious and material reasons already discussed.
In the classic confrontation between liberty and "despotic
equality" which followed, even many of the regime's cadre
turned against the shah.
By 1978, none of the concepts Huntington lists as
requirements for political modernization were present. The
shah had centralized authority, but it was not rationalized.
His bureaucratic structure was riddled with corruption.
Advancement was far more dependent on connection than
achievement. There was no real political participation; the
people neither controlled the government, nor increasingly
did the government control the people. The shah himself no
longer appeared to his people to possess any of the attri-
butes listed by Hudson as desired in an ideal Islamic
monarchy
.
These observations about the causes of the shah's fall
have been discussed in terms of five categories of factors:
domestic, economic. Islamic, foreign and leadership. The
first four contributed to or were symptomatic of the growing
asymmetry between rates of modernization (which is the core
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of the "king's dilemma"). That the shah was unable or
unwilling to enact policies to reverse that trend was
largely due to factors discussed in the leadership category.
The five categories also provide meaningful descriptors of
the modernizing path followed by King Hassan II of Morocco.
By conducting a similar review of Morocco's status, we ought
to discover the degree of development asymmetry that exists
in that country and be able to evaluate the effectiveness of
King Hassan's leadership in coping with it.
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IV. THE KING
For the U.S., having made a virtually unqualified verbal
commitment to the shah's political survival, the revolution
in Iran was a catastrophic foreign policy failure. In addi-
tion, it was a contributing factor in President Carter's
election defeat in 1980. It's not surprising, therefore,
that the similarities between U.S. support for King Hassan
and that given the shah are disturbing.
Both monarchies seem to have in common a similar lack of ^^-
broad-based support. For example, it can be argued that
Hassan's elite-based patrimonial system perpetuates the
inequities which many believe were the catalyst for the
shah's fall. In addition, Hassan's highly personalistic
,
centralized rule places him at the pinnacle of the state
bureaucracy and therefore suffers from the same weaknesses
as did the shah's. Critics of American support fear that
U.S. policy-makers are confusing America's national interest
with the king's welfare. They warn that the emphasis of
U.S. support for Morocco seems to be on the king, not the
country. The fact that the crown's domestic opposition
includes Islamic groups who denounce the king as a puppet of
the U.S. is another unsettling reminder of the recent
Iranian nightmare. [Ref. 43: pp. 178-9]
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American intelligence analysts, probably oversensitive
after missing early indications of the shah's impending
fall, have been zealous in pointing out such indications of
King Hassan's vulnerability, reinforcing the perception that
the king's hold on the reins of power in Morocco is at best
tenuous [Ref. 44: p. 19]. Such zealotry is understandable
when one considers the important strategic and political
interests of the United States which would be jeopardized if
King Hassan's regime were to be replaced by one less
friendly. Although the magnitude of U.S. interests in North
Africa differs from that of the rest of the Middle East, the
nature of American interests in the region is virtually
identical
.
U.S. involvement in the Middle East since World War II
is clearly traceable to three sets of issues: the U.S.
Soviet rivalry, American commitment to Israel and oil.
[Ref. 45: p. 14] U.S. interests in the region, therefore,
have remained basically the same since the Presidency of
Truman and the early days of "containment."
1. Denial of the area to Soviet influence/hegemony.
2. Access to the area's petroleum resources by the West
on reasonable terms.
3. Commitment to Israel's well-being as well as overall
regional stability. [Ref. 46: p. 154]
In North Africa, which is included with the Middle East
for bureaucratic as well as geographic and cultural reasons,
the scale of U.S. political, military and economic
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involvement has been smaller than in the Persian Gulf. The
thrust of the issues in North Africa, however, is much the
same. First, the area's strategic location makes it impor-
tant for the defense of Western Europe, thus the objective
of denying it to the Soviets remains as valid here as
farther east. Next, although petroleum resources are not as
great in North Africa as farther east, they are nonetheless
significant. Loss of direct access to North Africa's petro-
leum resources or loss of access to other resources via the
Straights would pose a serious threat to Western and U.S.
interests. Third, although North Africa's Arab regimes are
somewhat insulated from the Arab-Israeli dispute, the
region's leaders must still publicly support the Arab cause.
Often these leaders possess private channels of influence
with players more actively involved in the dispute which are
unavailable to the superpowers or other external actors.
Finally, it is in the U.S. interest, in this region as in
all others, that people live in peace and that acceptable
political and social values prevail. [Ref. 46: pp. 154-5]
The United States has its closest and most important
relations in the region with Morocco. Congressional
observers emphasized the importance of Morocco's strategic
location following a 1982 fact-finding mission to Morocco.
Perched on Africa's northwest shoulder, Morocco sits as
a southern gatekeeper to the Straights of Gibraltar
leading into the Mediterranean Sea. Unrestricted
shipping through this narrow ribbon of water between
Morocco and Spain is vital to the commerce and security
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of Europe and the Middle East. It is also a key passage
for the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet which patrols the
Mediterranean as a floating strike force and counter
weight to Soviet naval prestige in the region.
[Ref. 47: p. 4]
U.S. interests require a friendly ruler in the Straights
of Gibraltar for the obvious geo-political reasons just
cited. In the absence of clear alternatives to King
Hassan's rule, there has been general agreement that U.S.
interests would be best served if the king remained in
power. He is viewed on most issues as a pro-Western
moderate who shares with Washington a similar assessment of
the Soviet Union and its surrogates. In addition, King
Hassan has exercised his private channels of influence in
support of the initial Camp David process and recently
played a key role in laying the ground work for Egypt's
return to the Islamic Conference Organization. Throughout
the years, he has permitted American naval vessels to call
at Moroccan ports, allowed U.S. communications facilities
on Moroccan soil and has approved the execution of
U. S . -Moroccan joint military exercises. In 1982, King
Hassan granted the U.S. rights to the use of Moroccan facil-
ities by the Rapid Deployment Force in certain unspecified
contingencies. [Ref. 48: p. 193]
For. all of these reasons, the life expectancy of the
Moroccan regime is an important issue in the policy debate




1. Is U.S. support for King Hassan the best way to
promote stability in the country?
2. Should the U.S. hedge its bets in case Hassan falls?
The policies of the last three presidential administrations
indicate that each eventually decided it was worth the price
to provide moderate levels of military and economic assis-
tance aimed at keeping King Hassan in office. In relative
terms, The Reagan administration has taken the most opti-
mistic view of Hassan's prospects, demonstrating its deter-
mination to keep him in office with substantially increased
military and economic assistance. A strong factor providing
a logical basis for the current administration's commitment
to King Hassan is the relative soundness of his domestic
sources of stability in comparison to the shah's.
A. DOMESTIC FACTORS
1 . Power Base
King Hassan's legitimacy has deeper roots in history
than that of the shah, dating back 35 generations to the
Prophet. In this respect, he more nearly resembles the
ideal Islamic monarch described by Hudson. Members of the
Alawite dynasty, to which Hassan belongs, have ruled Morocco
since the 17th century. Although most of that period was
marked by tension between the "bilad al-makhsan" (lands of
government) and "bilad al-siba" (lands of dissonance), the
suzerainty of the Alawite sultan has been accepted without
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interruption for over 300 years. [Ref. 49: p. 20] One
legacy of the pre- colonial Maghreb which carried over into
the 20th century was this condition of normative unity and
political division [Ref. 50: p. 121].
Although Morocco's Islamic past is marked with
distinction, including a period of imperial rule, it entered
the 20th century with a medieval social system in an extreme
state of decay [Ref. 51: p. 201]. The effect of French
colonial rule during the first half of the 20th century was
actually to strengthen the control of the government.
French administration came at a time when Moroccan weakness
left it particularly vulnerable to European colonial expan-
sion. The French, by ending the division between the "siba"
and the "makhsan" extended the Sultan's temporal authority
for the first time to the countryside. [Ref. 52: pp. 50- 7]
The circumstances of Morocco's independence served
to further enhance the legitimacy of the sultanate. To
counteract nationalist uprisings in 1953, the French exiled
Sultan Mohammed V and replaced him with a more malleable
relative. That act turned out to be the catalyst for an
all-out drive for independence. The French were forced to
allow Mohammed V to return from exile in 1955, marking for
all practical purposes the end of colonial control. Formal
independence came in 1956 as Sultan Mohammed V became King
Mohammed V, the new title symbolizing a break with the past
and a more modern future [Ref. 51: p. 189].
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The ascendancy of Mohammed V clearly linked the
crown with independence and nationalism [Ref. 9: p. 223].
"Mohammed V had become something no Alawite sultan, however
peaceful had been before, an authentic popular hero...
a
maraboutic king." [Ref. 53: pp. 80-81] The monarchy's
symbolic association . with the nationalist struggle left
Mohammed V's son, Hassan II in a good strategic position to
exploit the crown's prestige as he consolidated its power.
Unlike most newly independent nations, the monarchy rather
than a modernized elite had played the central role as a
symbol of nationalism [Ref. 50: p. 137].
Hassan, unlike the shah, retained a traditional
constituency, composed of the large Alawite family, rural
notables, businessmen, a growing urban bourgeoisie and the
army officer corps, all linked by a ubiquitous web of
corruption. [Ref. 9: p. 226] In contrast to the case in
neighboring Algeria, the nationalist revolution in Morocco
was neither accompanied nor followed by a social revolution
and did not result in a redistribution of power. The
economic impacts of the relatively brief period of French
protectorate did not result in the high levels of class
conflict evoked by the much longer occupation that had
occurred in Algeria. [Ref. 54: p. 283] New opportunities in
the post-independence period led to some adjustments within
Moroccan social strata, but the traditional power relation-
ships were left intact.
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The king's authority has traditional roots in his
position as a member of the Alawite dynasty and his role as
spiritual leader, or imam, of the Islamic community. The
king's prestige and power are further enhanced by his
control of commercial activities and patronage. As the
nation's ultimate and most prominent dispenser of patronage,
the king has been able to coopt those not already committed
to him by the force of nationalism or traditionalism with
material appeals. [Ref. 55: p. A7]
At present, the Islamic clergy in Morocco occupies
only secondary importance. Most of the ulama to date remain
faithful supporters of Hassan and the institutions of the
monarchy. The king openly consults with the clergy and
gives the public appearance of total support for Islam.
[Ref. 56: pp. 58-9] Lacking his father's charisma as a hero
of the revolution, Hassan has placed official emphasis on
his role as a religious leader to enhance his regime's
legitimacy. Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution defines
the king as the "Amir al-Mouminine , Supreme Representative
of the Nation, symbol of its unity and guarantor of the
permanence and continuity of the state." [Ref. 57: p. 65]
The rural areas have been a major source of support
for the king because of their relative acquiescence to his
system of centralized power. Unlike the modern urban elites
who hold aspirations for exercising power, rural notables
and their more traditional followers are disinterested in
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such reforms as constitutional monarchy and economic decolo-
nization. [Ref. 50: p. 139] In a sense, the peasantry is a
disfavored group because their lack of clamor for change
allows the crown to ignore them. [Ref. 58: p. 11]. Despite
the crown's benign neglect of the rural masses, Hassan as
"Commander of the Faithful" is deeply venerated by them as
"sharif" (descendant of the Prophet) and as a dispenser of
"baraka" ( personal charisma) [Ref. 59: p. 406].
The group that poses the most visible and immediate
threat to the crown is the army. The coup attempts of 1971
and 1972 had come as complete shocks, because they came from
forces whose loyalty the crown had always taken for granted.
The army will always work in silence; it will remain
faithful to its oath and motto: My God, My Country, My
King--Moulay Hassan, 1962. [Ref. 60: p. 62]
After the failed coup of 1972, the king took immediate
action to restructure the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) with
renewed emphasis in its non-political character, its loyalty
to the king and its Muslim virtue [Ref. 54: p. 316]. In
addition, Hassan took advantage of a number of external
situations to rebuild the prestige of the senior officer
corps and tie them more tightly then ever to the crown.
Foremost has been the Sahara War, an irredentist
cause that the king has elevated to the level of national
crusade. In addition, Morocco's troops fought with distinc-
tion in the 1973 Middle East War and, in 1977 and 1978,
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successfully intervened on behalf of President Mobutu in
Zaire. King Hassan has been lavish in his praise of their
bravery and loyalty and has substantially increased the
military's material resources as well.
As a result of these measures, the army appears to
be staunchly loyal at the present. However, the morale of
the services is directly linked to continued success in the
Desert War. Should Morocco experience defeat, the army
would almost certainly seek to shift the blame for their
defeat to the king and would undoubtedly overthrow him.
[Ref. 61: p. 5] In the meantime, senior military officers
partake of the privileges and opportunities for enrichment
available to those at the upper levels of Hassan's clien-
telist system.
2 . Social Mobilization
Prior to independence, social stratification in
traditional Moroccan society consisted of generally similar
patterns in the Berber highlands, the rural Arab areas, and
the cities and towns. The top rank, or elite, were the
"shurfa" and the descendants of the marabouts. Next were
the religious intelligentsia, landlords, great merchants and
high government officials. The class that most closely
corresponded to the middle class followed- -tribal commoners
in Berber society, "fellahin" (small farmers) in the rural
areas, and retail merchants, artisans, etc. in the urban
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localities. The lowest level of society included Jews,
gypsies, and "imazilen" (shameless ones). [Ref. 62: p. 121]
After independence, a new social pyramid was gradu-
ally superimposed on these elements. A mitigating factor
was the fact that independence occurred simultaneously with
the beginning of a period of exponential population growth.
This was accompanied by a massive population transfer from
rural to urban areas. Elite society, therefore, took on an
urban flavor and was further characterized by family connec-
tions, activism against the French during the revolution,
Istiqlal Party membership^ and a school or university
connection with France.
Although Europeans had staffed most modern institu-
tions before independence, the French departure from Morocco
in 1956 created an insatiable demand for the small group of
Moroccans with a French education [Ref. 18: p. 243-4].
Those lucky few who qualified immediately assumed important
posts in the modern, governmental and cultural structures of
the burgeoning urban areas. This group constituted a new
bourgeois elite or middle class which soon engaged in the
conspicuous consumption of European consumer goods.
[Ref. 62: p. 115-6] Two other elements rounded out the
middle class: university trained professionals (doctors,
'The Istiqlal Party had been the most prominent nation-





) and the merchant class. The merchant class
is composed of two mutually antagonistic groups, the
Fassi- -natives of Fez, and the Soussi- -natives of the Sous
valley. Both groups amassed great wealth, have close ties
with the government, pray for the king's health and would be
likely targets of any revolutionary group. [Ref. 55: p.
B3-4]
The pattern of social change in Morocco followed
another traditional Moroccan pattern: "the enrichment of
the few and the impoverishment of the many." [Ref. 18: p.
89] Members of the traditional middle class saw demands for
their traditional skills diminish in relation to the rise of
modern urban society. The rate of growth of the numbers of
the impoverished outstripped the rate of overall population
growth, largely due to the inexorable exodus of poor and
landless peasants into the cities [Ref. 9: p. 175] The
criterion for access to the various strata of Moroccan
society had shifted from the traditional criterion of
ethnicity/caste to a more modern standard of ability to pay
[Ref. 18: p. 253].
Changing social values accompanied the changes in
Morocco's demography. The appeal of the benefits of
modernization were felt at all levels of society. Family
ties diminished in importance due to increased geographic
and social mobility. Women began to enjoy greater freedom
than in the past, including greater access to educational
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opportunities. They displayed a tendency to marry later,
work longer, and have fewer children. Western clothing,
music and ideas appeared with increasing frequency.
Nonetheless, certain features of traditional society
remained. One was the linkage of the traditional patronage
system with Morocco's jnodern system of administration.
John Waterbury, whose Commander of the Faithful is
considered the definitive work on Morocco's system of
segmented elites, views Hassan's system of patronage as a
deliberate system of planned corruption, cynically designed
to coopt any possible opposition to the regime.
Corruption serves one possible function, survival of the
regime. The vulnerable seek protection and thus regen-
erate links of dependency and patronage. Hassan's
dilemma is whether in the short term, survival can be
made compatible with rational administration and
economic development? In the long term, can it be made
compatible with planned corruption? [Ref. 63: p. 555]
One might take a less condemnatory position and note
that the regime's clientelist practices have roots deeply
imbedded in Moroccan culture. The situation in Morocco is
that the various social groups in competition for the
benefits of modernization lack the institutional channels to
achieve the modern values they have internalized. Thus,
they are forced to resort to traditional means to achieve
modern ends. Hassan merely exploits this heritage, using
his access to resources and control of appointments to
insure the survival of his regime. [Ref. 50: p. 138-9]
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The preceding comments about corruption point out
the dual nature of the impacts of corruption as social
development takes place. On one hand, the patrimonial
system has enabled to Hassan replace resistance to royal
authority with competition for royal favor. On the other
hand, the present patrimonial system simply lacks the
capacity to absorb the next generation of Moroccan elites.
Waterbury has written of the implications for instability of
Morocco's inevitable absorption crisis.
The post- 1956 emphasis on mass education combined with a
veritable demographic explosion has pumped unprecedented
numbers of Moroccans into all levels of the educational
system. Education has been a key to elite status in the
past, and it is unlikely that many of these youths will
settle for anything less in the future. Moreover, the
new aspirants will not have the common social background
of the present elite, the nationalist movement means
little to them, and it is improbable that existing alli-
ance and obligation systems will be able to absorb more
than a small number of them. Either the elite of today
will ignore the future aspirants, and will as a result
become obsolete, or it will attempt to absorb them and
thus will change utterly its behavior, its size, and its
nature. [Ref. 64: p. 164]
Like Iran, Morocco has undergone a revolution in
education. In 1969 there were 11,000 Moroccans enrolled in
courses of higher education. By 1979, the population of
students pursuing degrees at this level had increased to
70,000 [Ref. 56: p. 77]. Approximately 70 percent of
Morocco's university level students were still majoring in
the arts and letters rather than technical areas where
skills are sorely needed [Ref. 56: p. 79]. Thus, three
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factors contribute to the absorption crisis which looms on
the horizon for King Hassan
.
1. The sheer numbers of the emerging elite. The present
elite core can not possibly absorb thousands of new
members
.
2. Professional obsolescence. Few of the emerging
elites are trained for the types of jobs likely to be
available. .
.
3. The scarcity of jobs. Competence notwithstanding,
the government sector will not expand enough to
create jobs at a level consistent with the new
elites' aspirations. [Ref. 56: p. 81]
The absorption problem is related to the larger
problem of inequitable distribution of political and
economic opportunity which is characteristic of patrimonial
systems. As long as it was possible to distribute more and
more pieces of an ever-growing pie, it was possible to
ignore the aspirations of the the relatively powerless have-
nots. However, due to socio-economic and demographic
forces, the patronage pie is shrinking, and have-nots are
growing in numbers, political sophistication and influence.
(The stereotyped view of the urban migrant as an
"inarticulate clod-hopper" has become obsolete in this age
of mass communication, decreasing illiteracy and growing
political activism.) [Ref. 35: p. 185] Under these condi-
tions, only a total transformation of the economy will be
sufficient to provide the jobs needed to absorb Morocco's
growing population of job-seekers. As will be discussed in
Chapter V, Morocco's current economic plight makes this
development unlikely for the foreseeable future.
81
3 . Political Participation
During the first two decades of his rule, King
Hassan rejected the strategy of aligning with the modern
secular elites of the nationalist era. Such an alliance
would have facilitated the crown's exchange of traditional
legitimacy for modern, rationalized authority (i.e., the
rationalized authority of a constitutional monarchy).
Instead, King Hassan continued to capitalize on his pre-
eminence as a religious and national symbol. This approach
has been described as an "historic throwback to the pre-
modern, pre-protectorate sultanate." [Ref. 9: p. 224]
After his father's experiments with parliamentary
democracy in the early years of independence, Hassan gradu-
ally appropriated all power into his own hands, finally
declaring a state of emergency in 1965 and disbanding
parliament altogether. This policy appeared to directly
contradict the goals which Mohammed V had set forth upon his
return from exile in 1956.
The mission of this government in particular will be to
elaborate institutional reforms for the purpose of
making Morocco a democratic state with a constitutional
monarchy and to conduct negotiations with France
destined to make Morocco acquire the status of an inde-
pendent state united to France by permanent ties of a
freely consented and defined interdependence. [Ref. 51:
p. 184]
However, the king's statements to an American journalist in
1962 indicate that Hassan's intention was not to permanently
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abandon his father's ideal, rather that the king thought
conditions within Morocco made it necessary to adjust the
timetable for the ideal's implementation.
I could be a dictator if I chose.... My people wish me to
rule them because they have very little tradition of
self-rule. But ... dictatorship does not pay.... I am
building a house for you my children. I am going to put
furniture in it--even though you may not wish me to do
so. Oh, I know you may prefer to sleep on the floor,
our ancestors have done so and survived, but my duty is
to show you better ways. [Ref. 10: p. 281]
These remarks suggest that Hassan's intended legacy for his
people was still modern, democratic institutions, but only
when Morocco was, in his view, ready to receive them.
In the meantime. King Hassan mastered the art of
providing a brand of "participative democracy" that was more
apparent than real [Ref. 65: p. 65]. Although the 1962,
1970 and 1972 Moroccan constitutions each ostensibly
increased the political influence of the citizenry, all had
the ultimate effect of actually enhancing the control of
King Hassan [Ref. 66: p. 690]. Since the military coup
attempts, there have been a number of royal initiatives
intended to deflect pressure for political reform.
Early in 1972, the king had proposed a more liberal
constitution, in which two thirds, rather than one third, of
the seats would be filled by direct election. Later the
same year, following the military's second attempted coup,
the king mobilized the broad base of his support, dividing
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his opposition by coopting them with royal patronage,
compromising them with corrupt relationships, or simply
forcing their silence with repressive measures. [Ref. 9: p.
226] In 1973, in a move designed to appease proponents of
land reform, Hassan nationalized the remaining Moroccan land
held by foreigners and announced that all major businesses
were to be at least 51 percent Moroccanized [Ref. 52: p.
77]. Hassan's program of Moroccanization was intended to
spawn a loyalist class of "middle peasants" who owed their
prosperity to royal patronage [Ref. 67: p. 179].
Today, Morocco's eight major political parties serve
as "safety valves" within the political system. It should
be noted, however, that political party activities involve
only a minority of the population due to a literacy rate of
only 30 percent and general political apathy. The parties
themselves typically suffer from internal disunity, personal
rivalries, and poorly expressed programs. [Ref. 55: p. B12]
The inherent weaknesses of the parties have made it
relatively easy for the king to divide and manipulate the
leaders of the various factions, eliminating them altogether
if they threaten his political power. Nonetheless, the
crown allows members of the various factions to criticize
the system but tolerates absolutely no direct criticism of
the king. [Ref. 68: p. Bl] By tolerating political opposi-
tion, within certain undefined but well-understood rules of
the game, Hassan has been able to discourage most of his
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political antagonists from completely dropping out of the
system and engaging in more radical forms of opposition
[Ref. 66: pp. 693-4].
In contrast to Iran, Moroccans enjoy considerable
political freedom: the king has publicly pledged himself
toward the maintenance of democratic forms; the press is
relatively uncensored; and many political prisoners have
been freed. In addition, recent events point to a gradual
political evolution which raises the possibility that the
seeds for a long-term transition to more participative
government have been sown.
The results of the September/October 1984 elections
were relatively free of the charges of fraud which have
clouded the Moroccan electoral process in the past. The
elections featured major gains by the moderate left which
should enhance the regime's democratic image. Although the
legislature's powers are still very limited, the fact that
the king was prepared to allow even far left parties to
participate is seen as a further cautious step toward the
democratization of the regime.
The king sees Morocco's parties as "political
schools" and exploits their utility as "safety valves"
masterfully. For example, prior to this year's elections,
he ruled out independent candidates for the parliament. By
channelling Morocco's diverse political forces into parties,
the king avoids the danger of discontented sectors of the
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population becoming prey to political forces beyond his
control. [Ref. 69: p. 15-6]
King Hassan has made a number of political conces-
sions which seem to be moving the Moroccan polity toward a
more participative, less autocratic form. On the other
hand, the deck remains stacked so that the actual configura-
tion of power favors the king. Whether the king's liberal
initiatives stem from a true commitment to democracy or
represent tactical concessions to suppress dissent, the
structure of the system itself still makes democracy a
commodity that the king can grant or withhold at his
pleasure [Ref. 56: pp. 70-1].
B. THE ROLE OF ISLAM
1 . Legitimizing Influence
In Morocco, the king's attempts to integrate Islam
into the political system through its connection with his
office have been largely successful. Over the centuries,
the Sunni religious establishment of the Maghreb has
generally been seen as a part of the governing elite and has
tended to support the temporal ruler. [Ref. 46: p. 88] This
has been especially true in Morocco, where the king's posi-
tion is somewhat akin to that of the former Ottoman sultans
who were also caliphs. The Moroccan monarch has been
revered as Commander of the Faithful since 1349 when Abu
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Inan first adopted the title. [Ref. 51: p. 86] In addition,
Malekite jurisprudence, the school of Islamic thought
observed in Morocco, is the most nationalistic of the four
schools of Sunni Islam [Ref. 10: p. 10].
Islam became a valuable weapon in the nationalist
struggle when the French tried to impose the Berber "dahir"
in the 1930s. That dahir (decree) allowed Berbers to follow
their own laws, rather than adhere to the Sharia-based laws
of the sultanate. Nationalists saw this (correctly) as an
attempt to divide the Berbers from the Arabs and increase
French control. Berber and Arab nationalists fought back,
emphasizing the bonds of Islamic unity between Morocco's
Arab and Berber brethren. This strategy, which proved
highly effective, had the full support of Mohammed V, a
nationalist in his own right. [Ref. 57: p. 61-2]
Islam and national policy remain closely linked
today. For example, part of the justification for Morocco's
claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara is based on the
Islamic links which existed between the Moroccan sultan and
the "bilad al siba" centuries ago. Of course the overlay of
nationalism and Islam also adds to the dilemma of Morocco's
current ruler. Islam today finds itself increasingly in
conflict with the secular, modernist manifestations of the
nationalist movement with which it once aligned. [Ref. 50:
p. 99]
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As previously noted, there is at present no indica-
tion of unrest among the "ulama." The Moroccan Sultan/King
has for centuries been a religious leader as well as a
temporal ruler. This fact was even incorporated into the
1972 constitution. Thus, the monarchy stands as a formi-
dable combination of ".emir and imam." [Ref. 52: p. 50]
The king's position as imam may be irrelevant to the
secular-minded emerging elites, but it is still effective in
deterring criticism by the Islamic establishment. For the
time being, the fact that to oppose the monarchy is to
oppose the imam insulates Hassan from most of the turbulence
created by Islamic resurgence in the rest of the Arab world.
[Ref. 57: p. 65] However, the perception of overdependence
on the West, increasing levels of socio-economic discontent,
and the perceived corrupting effects of secular development
are all factors which could eventually weaken the good rela-
tionship the king presently enjoys with Morocco's Islamic
umma
.
2 . The Fundamentalist Specter
The fact that religious ferment is much less
apparent in Morocco than it was in Iran may be somewhat
deceiving. In Morocco, significant religious opposition to
the monarchy is less visible because it occurs outside the
religious establishment. The level of religion most rele-
vant to the urban or rural poor is likely to be one
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Morocco's working class religious groups, orders or sufi
brotherhoods. These groups are not tied to the king as is
the formal religious establishment and are in fact looked
down upon by the official ulama. While it is true that the
king derives legitimacy from this populist religious stratum
(which ascribes baraka to the king), this segment of society
is also the most affected by economic and social inequity in
Morocco. The influence of the popular orders, which have
historically resisted the king's temporal authority, has
reinforced the common belief of the masses that there is
much corruption and immorality in the palace. [Ref. 46: p.
95]
For the time being, the groups opposing the regime
do not speak with one voice, however they do have two
general principles in common: a desire for basic social,
economic and political reforms, and a desire to see Islam
restored as the guiding principle for building a better
society [Ref. 70: p. C3] In Morocco, the surface
manifestations of these activities are similar to those
which were observed in Iran and elsewhere: the sprouting of
beards, increasing return to the veil, pro-Khomeini
graffiti, inflammatory sermons, increased mosque attendance
by youth and occasional eruptions of violent protest
[Ref. 46: p. 96]. In part, the appeal of fundamentalism
lies with Islam's opposition to what are now perceived to
have been the evils of the secular, modernist domination of
post-independence society.
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The tenets of populist Sunni Islam, like Shiism,
have a significant social content:
1. Fundamental faith in the Koran.
2. Opposition to corruption/oppression.
3. Commitment to equality/ justice
,
4. Condemnation of. imperialist intervention. [Ref. 71:
p. 111.]
Fundamentalists scorn what they see as King Hassan's lack of
dedication to these principles, using that assertion to stir
up further discontent among the masses. The growing
economic and political discontent under his rule has added
to the resurgent interest in Islam at other levels of
Moroccan society. Islam's potential as a vehicle for organ-
izing and coordinating opposition to the crown can not be
ignored. Demographic changes give this last factor even
greater significance. The king's religious prestige has
always been greatest in the countryside, yet 44 percent of
the Moroccan population now live in the cities, as compared
to 14 percent in 1956. [Ref. 66: pp. 693-4]
As in Iran, the gap between the new urban immigrants
and the older Westernized elite is continuously increasing.
The urban masses form a natural reservoir of disaffection,
suspicious of the Westernized elite and the secular system
which seems to have deprived them of their fair share of
society's rewards. [Ref. 35: p. 186] Although the Islamic
groups who could exploit this dissatisfaction have yet to
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effectively organize or coordinate their opposition, the
crown takes their potential seriously. For instance, the
government has formed its own "official" Popular Islamic
Reform Movement as evidence that it shares the people's
commitment to Islamic values. In addition, it has increased
the religious content in the public school curriculum.
Finally, the government has sought to place its own agents
in the various Islamic reform organizations. These prima-
rily cosmetic steps fail to address the underlying economic
and social conditions which have made Morocco fertile ground
for the fundamentalist movement. Therefore, even though the
religious threat to the crown is currently under control, it
is likely to persist and continue to grow for the foresee-
able future.
C. LEADERSHIP FACTORS
1. A Prince Groomed To Be King
In February 1961, Mohammed V died unexpectedly
following routine surgery. Crown Prince Moulay Hassan
succeeded him in Morocco's traditional manner. We have
already discussed some of the advantages related to prestige
and legitimacy bequeathed to the young monarch by his
father. In addition to these elements of authority,
Mohammed V had designed and executed a careful program to
groom his eldest son for the eventual assumption of the
91
Moroccan throne. Since Hassan's succession to the throne,
he has demonstrated that he also inherited the strong will
and innate leadership qualities required to succeed in that
role
.
As a young man, Hassan attended the Imperial College
of Morocco, an institution which Mohammed V founded espe-
cially for his sons. The sultan realized that Moroccan
schools were rather backward in their curriculum but hesi-
tated to enroll his son in a European school where the
program of studies would have little relevance to life in
Morocco. He decided to create an institution in Morocco
which would combine the best of both cultures. The sultan
insured that the new Imperial College was staffed with the
best native and French scholars from Rabat's lycee and hired
a distinguished French educator to serve as the institu-
tion's director.
Young Hassan was given no preference but quickly
displayed the intellectual superiority which had marked his
education as a youth. A voracious reader, polished linguist
and avid athlete, he finished at the top of his class and
continued his studies in law. His law curriculum and
studies were directed by the University of Bordeaux. After
finishing his thesis, he appeared before the university's
examining board and was awarded his "Diplome" (corresponding
to a Master of Arts degree). [Ref. 72: pp. 36-41]
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This stage of his education over, Hassan learned to
fly, received French naval training and. increasingly became
a close confidant and trusted advisor to his father the
king. When it became apparent in 1951 that the French colo-
nialists were not about to make any concessions to Moroccan
desires for independence, it was the crown prince who opened
the sultan's eyes to the necessity for an uncompromising and
ruthless policy of resistance.
Their period of exile in Madagascar (1953-55)
brought the father and son even closer together. When
France finally sent emissaries to Madasgascar in 1955 to
discuss Mohammed V's possible return to Morocco, Moulay
Hassan was an active participant in the discussions. It was
he who pressed his father to make no concessions and to
insist that his return to the throne and Morocco's immediate
independence were the only basis for future Franco-Moroccan
relations. [Ref. 72: pp. 41-51]
After independence, King Mohammed V appointed his
son to be the first Chief of Staff of the FAR. Hassan's
troops were composed of 24,000 soldiers who had received
their training under the colonial armies of Spain and France
and 8,000 veterans of the former National Liberation Army.
Hassan devoted his energy to molding this eclectic force
into the most efficient army Morocco's limited means would
allow. The positive impact of Hassan's leadership was first
demonstrated when Morocco sent two battalions of the FAR to
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the Congo in 1960. Hassan's deputy, General Kittani, was
appointed second-in-command of the UN forces in the Congo
and Morocco's troops were recognized as among the best that
had been sent to the country. [Ref. 72: pp. 52-4]
Later that year, Mohammed V appointed Hassan as Vice
Premier. Without giving up his post as Chief of Staff,
Hassan presided over cabinet meetings, guided the day to
day affairs of the government and influenced the final shape
and direction of its policies. Upon the untimely death of
Mohammed V, Morocco realized the dividends of the crown
prince's rigorous apprenticeship: the country was left with
an heir-designate well acquainted with and prepared for the
demands of national leadership. [Ref. 72: pp. 54-60]
2. Will and Leadership
The international press and American diplomatic
officials seriously underestimated the abilities of the
young monarch. As crown prince, U.S. military leaders had
concluded that Hassan was "haughty and weak... but that his
fallacious, mystic, neutral psychology could be modified by
a determined effort to win his confidence." [Ref. 10: p.
288] Immediately after Mohammed's sudden death, many experts
predicted a coup against his "inconsequential playboy" son
within 48 hours
.
Since that time, the conventional wisdom has been
that as progressive urbanization and modernization caused
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growing numbers of Moroccans to question the king's divine
right to rule, Hassan's crown would inevitably follow the
path of so many other monarchies in the developing world and
be overturned [Ref. 66: p. 694]. However, there were no
profits to be made by betting against the Moroccan king over
the last quarter century. Hassan has demonstrated a remark-
able instinct for capitalizing on adversity and making the
decisions necessary to disarm and divide his opposition.
While still Chief of staff, Prince Moulay Hassan
made the force of his decisive leadership felt during the
aftermath of the 1960 earthquake in Agadir. He saw that the
situation called for trained, disciplined men. Therefore,
he immediately commanded that his troops cordon off the
ruined area, ordered residents excluded and had looters
shot. Despite local criticism of his harsh measures, Hassan
recognized the danger of epidemic due to Moroccans' general
lack of sophistication about the health dangers involved.
Hassan never flinched from taking the immediate measures he
believed to be necessary to avert the possible spread of
disease, despite the criticism.
Hassan's actions during and following the military
coup attempts of the early 1970s also illustrate his ability
to think and act fast when facing an emergency. When aissi-
dent Air Force pilots strafed the king's Boeing 727 in 1972,
Hassan displayed his cool wit under pressure by getting on
the radio himself and announcing, "You've killed the king.
Don't hurt anyone else." [Ref. 73: p. 48]
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Following this coup attempt, the king showed his
determination to ruthlessly suppress those he considered
dangerous elements. Hassan had 220 Air Force members
arrested and eventually had 11 officers executed [Ref. 67:
p. 178]. Among Hassan's people, especially among the masses
of uneducated Moroccans, the king's narrow escapes strength-
ened their mystical regard for his crown. "If our king
miraculously escaped death twice, it is because he has
baraka. God is with him." [Ref. 9: p. 227]
Hassan's reaction to the fact that the unquestioned
loyalty of the military had proved to be a myth was not
merely to increase repression. This sort of turbulence from
his natural constituency on the right could not be
dismissed. Hassan understood that a more thoughtful
response was called for once the immediate danger had been
removed. Therefore he decided to gradually end the state of
emergency, allowing greater political participation, rather
than imposing stricter controls. [Ref. 58: p. 30]
Hassan has shown no tendency to freeze in time of
crisis. In fact, he has proven to be a master of exploiting
external crises to take the edge off other problems. In
that respect, the timing of the Western Saharan issue could
not have been better. The King acted decisively to take
over the phosphate rich territory. In the process, he:
1. Reaffirmed his crown's identification with
nationalism.
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2. Built unanimous support for the crown's decision by
arousing in Moroccans a renewed nationalist fervor.
3. Repaired his frayed relations with the officer corps.
4. Renewed the national consensus that was being threat-
ened by festering political and economic
dissatisfaction.
As a legitimacy building device, Hassan's use of the Western
Sahara issue has been brilliant. [Ref. 9: p. 228]
Hassan has proven his mastery of the levers of power
by his deft manipulation of his many roles: Commander of the
Faithful, nationalist crusader, political ruler, "grand
patron", liberal reformer and father figure. The recently
departed American Ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Reed, has
described King Hassan as an "enlightened, experienced
monarch... in touch with his people." [Ref. 74: p. 25]
The king has demonstrated his sensitivity to the
long-term problems of growing socio-economic inequality.
Following the Casablanca riots of 1981, he radically modi-
fied the city's government, giving greater responsibility to
energetic young officials and giving them a charter to clean
up the city and end unemployment [Ref. 46: p. 32]. In a
moment of frank self-criticism, he later conceded that a
more effective school system would serve national interests
better than additional security forces [Ref. 3: p. 31].
Hassan has displayed an apparently boundless
capacity for flexibility. The recent pact with Libya
stands as a prime example. This initiative deflates
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Hassan's image as a tool of the West, removes from the
Polisario an important source of arms and promises to allev-
iate some of Morocco's unemployment problems. Such imagina-
tive foreign policy initiatives have won for Hassan near
superstar status in the arena of international diplomacy.
By surviving .into the 1980s, Hassan has already
proven that monarchies are not as immediately vulnerable to
the forces of modernization as some theorists had suggested.
[Ref. 9: p. 229] For the immediate future, his rule seems
secure. His longer term challenge is to hold off moderniza-
tion's opposing forces, while nurturing the gradual develop-
ment of a political system in which Morocco's resources are
more equitably distributed, a system that might someday




V. MOROCCO'S ECONOMY AND THE IMPACT OF THE DESERT WAR
Some years ago, General Charles de Gaulle referred to
Morocco as a country "with its revolution still to come."
[Ref. 75: p. A19] In contrast, more recent political anal-
ysis has tended to downplay the possibility of extensive
political violence, at least in the short term [Ref. 76: p.
950] . Although the potential for political turmoil appears
to be high, the most current Frost and Sullivan World
Political Risk Forecast still rates King Hassan's regime as
most likely to prevail over possible military or fundamen-
talist alternative regimes^ [Ref. 55: p. CI].
As previously discussed, concern about the possibility
of sudden political change has fueled the ongoing Washington
policy debate over support for King Hassan's regime. The
debate is given both impetus and urgency by what is essen-
tially the "Hobson's choice" confronting Morocco's ruler.
On one hand, the king must broaden the basis of Morocco's
economy to meet the grave material needs of his nation's
'The Frost and Sullivan forecasters assign Hassan a 55
percent, probability as most likely regime over the next 18
months. Military and religious fundamentalist alternative
regimes receive 35 percent and 10 percent ratings respec-
tively. It's worth noting that optimism about the Moroccan
monarchy diminishes over the longer term. The probabilities
assigned to the various alternatives over the next five




growing population. On the other hand, the very legitimacy
of the crown seems to be tied to the irredentist war in the
Western Sahara, the cost of which is scuttling Morocco's
most critical social and economic goals. All the while, due
to his country's dismal economic state, Hassan has had to
rely on external assistance to make progress on either
front. This has placed Morocco's king in a predicament
similar to that once encountered by the shah. Hassan, like
the shah, must measure the abstract benefits and concrete
costs of appearing independent against the concrete benefits
and indirect dangers of appearing to rely excessively on
external assistance.
On the Saharan front, improved military tactics as well
as new developments in the diplomatic picture have resulted
in achieving at least stalemate in the desert war, albeit at
tremendous cost. This chapter will also focus on those
costs and the impact of their diversion from the country's
attempts to solve its economic problems. Since the goal of
this thesis is to assess the crown's stability, the non-
economic impacts of the desert war will also be addressed.
The starting point is Morocco's economic situation.
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A. THE ECONOMY
1. The Dismal Economic Situation
Unlike most Third World nations, Morocco is a poten-
tially rich developing country. It possesses two-thirds of
the world's known resierves of phosphate rock, as well as
fertile croplands, significant grazing areas, rich fishing
grounds, potentially large natural gas deposits and a well-
developed tourist industry. [Ref. 77: p. 503] The U.S.
Department of Commerce rates Morocco's long-term economic
prospects as very promising.
The Department of Commerce report notes that in both
the agricultural and fishing industries, the country's abun-
dant resources leave room for further expansion. In addi-
tion, the development of the Essaouira gas fields, if as
large as anticipated, should significantly lower Morocco's
dependence on imported crude oil (as the region's "hydro-
carbon Cinderella", Morocco relies on foreign sources for 87
percent of its energy needs). Finally, Morocco's 65 to 75
percent share of world phosphate reserves and its developing
phosacid production capacity should enable it to dominate
the world phosphate market by the 1990s. [Ref. 78: pp. 7-9]
Yet today, the average Moroccan finds himself
severely depressed. 50 percent of the country's almost 24
million people live below the poverty line. Seven million
dwell in absolute poverty [Ref. 68: p. H3] . Illiteracy is
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over 75 percent. With a $12 billion foreign debt (about 90
percent of the GNP), Morocco's interest payments alone have
absorbed 36 percent of its export earnings since 1981.
[Ref. 79: p. 23] These conditions have forced austerity meas-
ures which have postponed the country's ambitious growth
schemes and even threaten the survival of many of its
poorest citizens.
Given this dismal economic situation and Morocco's
relative resource abundance, one must wonder why the country
has not been able to better exploit its advantages. As one
IMF official succinctly summarized, "...economic conditions
moved against Morocco." [Ref. 80: p. 215] The country's
problems are a typical litany of Third World tribulations:
1. Four straight years of drought.
2. Growing foreign debt/balance of trade problems.
3. Falling prices for phosphates, its largest export
commodity
.
4. One of the world's highest population growth rates.
Morocco's situation is further complicated by the costs of
the eight-year old "open-ended" war in the Western Sahara.
A brief review, of the factors contributing to Morocco's
economic problems will define the dimensions of the unpala-
table options facing King Hassan.
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2. Dimensions of the Problem
a. Drought
Since agriculture is the key to the economy in
Morocco, the past four years of severe drought have had a
devastating impact. , Almost 60 percent of the population
live in the countryside and over 50 percent of the working
population are engaged in agricultural or closely related
occupations. In addition, agriculture provides a high
proportion of the country's food and about 30 percent of
total exports. Therefore, bad agricultural years are felt
in every sector.
In 1981, the worst year of drought in 35 years,
agricultural production fell off as much as 50 percent with
the overall decline measured at 25 percent. Vast expanses
of the country's southern farmlands were desiccated and over
one million of the country's three million head of cattle
had to be slaughtered. Many rivers have since dried up,
shutting down hydro-electric plants and increasing require-
ments for imported oil. Perhaps the most serious conse-
quence in terms of destabilizing effects was that the
drought accelerated the rural exodus to Casablanca,
Marrakesh and Rabat, cities whose public services were
already strained to the breaking point. [Ref. 70: p. A4]
Drought -induced food shortages were major
factors in a number of serious examples of social unrest,
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including the bloody food riots which occurred in Casablanca
in 1981 and again in Nador, Tetuan, Al Hoceima and Marrakesh
in January 1984. [Ref. 81: p. 35] Once largely self-
sufficient and a net food exporter, Morocco's growing popu-
lation has outstripped the drought-plagued agricultural
sector's ability to feed it. Imported food stuffs, espe-
cially among such staples as cereals, sugar and dairy prod-
ucts are becoming increasingly significant and place a
growing strain on an already unfavorable balance of trade.
[Ref. 77: p. 504]
b. Debt/Trade
The trade imbalance is only one of the factors
which have combined to produce a foreign debt which propor-
tionately exceeds that of such well-known financial basket-
cases as Argentina and Brazil. The debt, which in 1972
corresponded to only 17 percent of Morocco's GNP , has
reached 90 percent, making Morocco one of the most heavily
indebted countries in the world. [Ref. 82: p. 7108]
Morocco's inability to meet its obligations is
further exacerbated by a relative decrease in the value of
the dirham of over 60 percent in relation to the dollar
since 1980 [Ref. 78: p. 5]. That, of course, means higher
dirham costs for dollar-denominated imports like grain and
energy. Even the energy glut has worked against Morocco.
Lower energy prices have reduced revenues to OPEC, causing
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Morocco's Saudi benefactors to be less generous and
increasing Moroccan dependence on IMF funds. [Ref. 83: p.
A19]
Another factor contributing to the balance of
payment/debt problem is rising interest rates. They are a
factor in the world-wide recession which has held down
tourism and limited Moroccan access to other markets that
are experiencing economic difficulties of their own. In
addition, they add to the cost of servicing the debt. With
so many factors working to increase the level and burden of
the debt, and so few working to increase current accounts,
the government has had no choice but to trade off growth for
an austerity program by cutting back sharply on non-
essential imports and government development plans.
Although the goals of the $21.4 billion Five
Year Development Plan (1981-85) have not been modified, IMF
scrutiny of the plan resulted in substantial cuts.
1. Job creation
2. Diversification of industry
3. Decentralization away from the Casablanca-Khenitra
industrial axis
4. Improved food and energy production [Ref. 84: p. 6]
With IMF performance targets clearly in place, the govern-
ment has held the Moroccan economy on a tight leash. In
1983, the prices of formerly subsidized consumer products
were raised between 17 and 67 percent; prices for petroleum
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products were raised; government hiring was slashed; opera-
tions and investment budgets were lowered; and taxes were
increased. 1984 saw more of the same including the elimina-
tion of an additional 8,000 bureaucratic positions through
attrition. [Ref. 78: pp. 7-8]
Commentators almost unfailingly point out the
apparent cause-effect relationship of IMF-dictated austerity
measures to the food riots of 1981 and 1984. Some suggest
that Morocco needs a massive injection of capital on conces-
sional terms to stimulate its economy. This is in response
to the general fear that severe financial conditions, when
applied to such precarious situations, are as likely to lead
to increasing chaos as financial recovery. [Ref. 85: pp.
750-51] At any rate, no single sector from within the
economy has shown the vigor to alter the trend of increasing
debt.
c. Phosphates
Perhaps most disappointing of all, the depressed
phosphate market means Morocco's number one export will be
unable to make its hoped for heavy contribution to the
budget. Although the Soviet Union and the United States
produce more phosphate rock than Morocco, they both retain
approximately 80 percent of their production for domestic
consumption. With only modest domestic requirements,
Morocco is able to commit 90 percent of its production to
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export, making it the world's leading phosphate exporter.
Because the depressed market for this commodity has been the
key factor in Morocco's unfavorable foreign exchange posi-
tion, the importance of phosphates has received a lot of
emphasis
.
In fact, phosphate revenues average about the
same as those for tourism and are only one- fourth as large
those from agricultural production. Since 1974, Morocco has
attempted to capitalize on its export strength to control
phosphate prices. However, the kingdom failed to account
for a number of external factors in its attempt to establish
a sort of one- country "phosphate OPEC." Although its
efforts were largely responsible for a temporary increase in
price from $14 a ton to $68 a ton, that price increase also
attracted new sources of phosphate rock and new competition
into the market. As a result, over-production and price-
competition exacerbated the depressing effect of the global
recession on the world phosphate market. [Ref. 49: pp.
27-8.]
By 1983, the value of phosphate rock exports had
decreased from a 1980 value of $792 million to only $459
million [Ref. 78: p. 2.] Morocco's structural position
forces it to rely on export revenues to pay for the imports
needed to broaden its economy's base. Unfortunately, phos-
phates have failed to produce these revenues, joining the
growing list of reasons that explain why development has
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been postponed and Morocco's growing population has had to
focus on survival rather than growth.
d. Population
At the current rate of population growth, even
mere survival may be an optimistic goal. The population,
which stood at 15.4 million in 1972, was estimated at 24
million in mid-1984. At the present growth rate of 2.8
percent, the population will exceed 36 million by 2000. In
contrast, agriculture grew at a rate of only 0.8 percent in
1970-80 and, of course, has declined in this decade due to
the extended drought. [Ref. 86: p. 24, p. 54]
The 1982 census confirmed the extent of the
massive urban migration. For example, the population of
Casablanca experienced an increase of 3.3 million in only 11
years [Ref. 77: p. 503]. The growth of Morocco's crowded
cities (from 14 to 44 percent of the population since 1956)
created pressure on all public services. The exploding
urban population has also created a tremendous requirement
for jobs which Morocco's- stagnant economy simply can not
fill. Hassan for a time was able to use government employ-
ment as a disguised form of urban relief to keep the
expanding urban population from rebelling [Ref. 18: p. 246].
However, debt-induced austerity measures, as previously
discussed, forced an end to this practice.
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The consequences of extreme population growth
fall into two categories and are uniformly bad. The first
group of consequences includes those that adversely affect
economic development, political stability and human rights
within developing countries. In the second category, out-
of-control population .growth rates tend to perpetuate ineq-
uities between rich and poor at all levels within the
international system. Specific consequences are rising
unemployment rates, expanding urban populations, pressure on
food supplies and an increase in the number of "absolute
poor." [Ref . 87: p. 1113]
Each of the aforementioned consequences afflict
the Moroccan economy to varying degrees. The growing gap
between the rich and poor may have the greatest potential
for stimulating opposition to the crown in Morocco. As long
as 10 percent of the population continues to absorb 45
percent of the nation's wealth, Morocco will continue to be
heading, in King Hassan's own words, "...for a society where
the poor will be very poor and the rich will be very rich."
[Ref. 56: p. 83]
To reduce the growing socio-economic disparity
between the classes in healthy economic conditions would be
a tall order. To merely manage the socio-economic discon-
tent created by the inherent inequalities of King Hassan's
system may be impossible under the current conditions. One
means of response still available to the regime, as its
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response to last January's food riots demonstrated, is
increased repression.
After 1984 *s "troubles", those concerned about
the future of the monarchy in Morocco could not help but
unhappily speculate about the long term results of the
pattern of unrest, conflict, coercion and repression which
seemed to be developing there.
Growth in GNP , diminished inflation, and fewer strikes
may be achieved but at a huge cost in terms of repres-
sion, income redistribution, elimination of national
entrepeneurship , increased poverty of the urban and
rural sectors, and alienation of intellectuals and
students. [Ref. 88: p. 470]
The riots were taken by some observers as strong indicators
that material problems of existence may be of greater
concern to the. majority of Moroccans than the Sahara War
which has been diverting much needed resources away from
society [Ref. 89: p. 5].
B. IMPACT OF THE DESERT WAR
It would be difficult to overstate the effect of the
tremendous expense of the war on other sectors of the
economy. From the very beginning, the costs of this
conflict have outweighed any conceivable material gains.
When the campaign for the Western Sahara began in 1975,
Morocco had only 61,000 men under arms and a military budget
of $190 million [Ref. 90: p. 418]. By 1984, the strength of
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the armed forces had doubled to 125,000, and the military
budget had expanded by a factor of greater than seven, to
$1.4 billion [Ref. 91: p. 37]. At an estimated $1 to 2
million a day, the war is bleeding Morocco white. A private
estimate by the Banque du Maroc, which has been confirmed by
diplomatic sources, places the true cost of the war at 50
percent of Morocco's GDP. [Ref. 80: p. 217] In addition,
the war has isolated Morocco from other African states and
is regarded with distaste by her Western allies.
Why then, given these considerations, has King Hassan
become so committed to this war? John Damis , in Conflict
in Northwest Africa [Ref. 49], answers this question with an
evenhanded analysis of the internal, regional and interna-
tional explanations for Morocco's involvement in the Sahara.
For the purposes of this study, however, we will limit our
attention to factors which explain Hassan's Saharan stance
in terms of domestic politics and regime stability.
Domestic political factors provide the key to understanding
why, as even Hassan's critics admit, precipitate withdrawal
from the Sahara campaign would probably cost the king not
only his throne but his life. [Ref. 92: p. 295].
1 . Complex Causes
The complicated factors that led Hassan to bring
Morocco into the war make it very difficult for him to
withdraw.
Ill
If Morocco is independent, it is not completely unified.
The Moroccans will continue the struggle until Tangier,
the Sahara from Tindouf to Colomb-Bechar , Touat^
Kenadzn, Mauritania are liberated and unified. Our
independence will only be complete with the Sahara! The
frontiers of Morocco end in the south at St.
Louis-du-Senegal! -- Allal el-Fassi, June 19, 1956
[Ref. 67: p. 85]
At first, thes.e extravagant proposals surprised most
Moroccans, but in the heady aftermath of independence, this
idealized version of Morocco's borders captured the hearts
of Moroccan nationalists. The Istiqlal party formally
endorsed these territorial claims at its first post-
independence conference in 1956. [Ref. 67: p. 87] In the
years following independence, the concept of a "Greater
Morocco", corresponding to the areas controlled by the
Almoravid dynasty of the 11th and 12th century, eventually
had to be reconciled with the realities of the post-colonial
borders of the newly independent states of Mauritania, Mali
and Algeria. Nevertheless, Morocco's irredentist fervor
remained strong, shifting its focus to the Spanish held
lands of the Western Sahara.
The legitimacy of the Moroccan claims is based in
part on its unique status as a sovereign nation prior to the
colonial era. To almost every Moroccan, the tribal, ethnic
and religious ties between the "siba" and the "makhsan",
which are the basis of the claim, are self-evident and not
subject to serious questioning. [Ref. 49: p. 15] Moroccans
contend that European colonialism arbitrarily detached
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people and land from the sultan's domain. These claims have
some legitimacy. For instance, the French detached the
Tindouf region of Algeria from Morocco in 1952 as a reaction
to the Moroccan nationalist movement, attaching this region
to its "metropolitan" colony. Morocco based its right to
restore the lost Saharan territory on two arguments:
1. The fact that the Moroccan ruler's spiritual and
temporal authority was unchallenged in the region.
2. The conviction that the process of decolonization
should not be used to perpetuate the "geographic
absurdities" inflicted by Europeans on sovereign
nations. [Ref. 93: p. 213]
In terms of regime stability, the emotion generated
by this irredentist issue had significant implications. The
monarchy in the immediate post-independence era could not
afford to lag behind the political parties with which it was
competing in demonstrating its nationalist fervor.
Moreover, since the very basis of the claims glorified the
historic powers of the sultanate, Mohammed V saw that this
issue could easily be used to boost royal prestige.
Accordingly, the monarchy threw the full weight of the
government behind the "Greater Morocco" cause. In March
1958, Mohammed V publically promised to
strive with all our power to recover our Sahara and
everything which by the evidence of history and the will
of the inhabitants belongs of right to our kingdom.
[Ref. 67: p. 88]
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From that point on, the Sahara became for Moroccan
nationalists a piece of sacred "terra irredenta." [Ref. 46:
p. 109] The emotion attached to this issue leaves the
monarchy little room for maneuver. Although neither
Mohammed V or King Hassan originated Morocco's claims to the
Western Sahara, the .issue has become identified with the
fundamental tenets of Moroccan nationalism and has made the
monarchy its prisoner. Hassan, as a result, finds himself
in the delicate position of having to restrain various
elements of the FAR and the Moroccan polity who still
espouse the most extreme irredentist claims to a "Greater
Morocco." John Damis likens Hassan's position to that of a
man forced to ride a tiger in the midst of a war he cannot
afford to lose. [Ref. 94: p. 174]
Since 1975, Morocco's armed forces have been
fighting a bloody but relatively unpublicized guerilla war
to assert sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of "Rio
de Oro" , now known as the Western Sahara. Morocco's phys-
ical opposition has been the Polisario ("Frente Popular para
la liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro"), led by a
highly dedicated cadre of Sahrawi nationalists committed to
Saharan independence. Yet the Polisario has virtually no
material resources of its own. The front has been entirely
dependent upon external sources to provide the military
equipment and economic means to continue to prosecute the
war.
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This support has come from either Algeria or Libya,
both of whom rely on the Soviet bloc for approximately. 90
percent of their arms [Ref. 67: p. 354.]. Libya's support
for the Polisario, while significant, has been seasonal.
Since well before the recent pact between King Hassan and
Col. Qaddafi, there were no Libyan arms deliveries to the
Polisario. By contrast Algerian support has been steadfast
since the very onset of hostilities. Not only did they
provide the Polisario with arms, but all Libyan arms trans-
fers have transited Algerian territory and been completed
under Algerian supervision. Most importantly, the Algerians
continue to provide the Polisario Front with sanctuary and
material support in the Tindouf region of Algeria.
For the preceding reasons, as well as others more
deeply rooted in historical antagonisms, many observers
believe the desert war camouflages the larger struggle for
regional hegemony which is taking place between the region's
major powers, Algeria and Morocco. Thus Algeria, through
its public support of the principle of self-determination,
has been able to wage a costly proxy war against its number
one regional rival, Morocco. [Ref. 49: p. 34]
In King Hassan's view, the enemy in the desert is
not the Polisario; instead it is their Algerian patrons. He
sees Algeria's goal as not the liberation of the Western
Sahara but the overthrow of his monarchy. [Ref. 74: p. 23]
King Hassan views his Saharan policy more as an attempt by a
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regional power to preserve the staus quo by fending off
other regional rivals than as an expansionist assertion, of
dominance over a weaker nation [Ref. 95: p. 50-1]. To
Hassan, the issue is one of national security. He has
convinced most Moroccans that they are defending their
country against an external threat. In that context, of
course, policy options either do not exist or at best are
quite limited. [Ref. 96: p. 32]
The rationale for this position is based on the
Moroccan belief that the Polisario is purely a creation of
its regional rival. According to the Moroccan version, the
majority of the Polisario 's fighting forces are not
Sahrawis. These guerilla fighters, Moroccans claim, are
mercenaries in the pay of the Algerians. They further
contend that most of the "Sahrawi refugees" of the Tindouf
are actually from Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and other
drought-afflicted Sahelian countries. [Ref. 69: p. 14]
Morocco has yet to produce convincing evidence to
substantiate these claims. Moreover, there is little doubt
that the Polisario movement has as its core leadership a
dedicated cadre of Sahrawi nationalists. Nonetheless, its
equally clear that the Polisario guerillas would be unable
to sustain effective operations against Morocco were it not
for the military, economic and basic needs support it
receives from Algeria. It costs Algeria relatively little
to provide the Polisario with a level of support sufficient
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to keep Moroccan troops tied down in their defensive
positions. .
King Hassan has often said that "my Russia is
Algeria." [Ref. 97: p. CI] Moroccans of all political
stripes join the king in blaming Algeria for the ongoing
conflict, arguing that Algerian support for self-
determination is pragmatic, opportunistic and hypocritical.
The Moroccan view of the conflict in the Western Sahara as a
struggle against a rival state rather than as a struggle
against a dedicated band of freedom fighters is a frequent
theme of the national press as this excerpt from the pro-
government Casablanca daily, Le Matin du Sahara , illus-
trates :
Everybody is perfectly aware of the fact that- -aside
from the intransigents in the Algerian regime- -there is
no liberation movement in the Sahara, that the whole
affair is simply an aggression perpetrated by Algiers to
seize part of our Saharan provinces in order to encircle
Morocco and cut it off from Mauritania, which wculd form
an easy prey for Algerian expansionism, and finally
separate Morocco once and for all from black Africa.
[Ref. 49: p. 24]
Moroccans may overstate their case by completely discounting
ideological consistency as a motivation for Algeria's deci-
sion to support the Sahrawi rebels. Nevertheless, Moroccans
are correct when they assert that there would be few signs
of armed conflict today had Algeria elected to remain
passive or neutral in the dispute.
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2. Deceptive Effects
The complex network of internal, regional and inter-
national causes for the conflict in Northwest Africa has
made it difficult to discern the relationship between cause
and effect in the region. The nature of the fighting, the
emotions generated by the cause and the pressures exerted by
Morocco's other serious problems have forced King Hassan to
operate in a generally reactive mode. He has found it
difficult to adopt policies aimed at producing strategic
advantages, forced by the pressures of the moment to settle
for whatever, if any, tactical advantages are at hand. As a
result, the impact of the desert war on the monarchy's
stability has been deceptive. Its immediate impact has been
positive--a restoration of the national consensus and the
prestige of the monarchy. In the longer term, however, the
costs of sustaining or eventually winning the struggle for
the Sahara may turn Morocco's national consensus sour and
even encourage radical political change.
a. Short-term benefits
We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of
revolution. --V. K. Phleve, Russian Minister of the
Interior, 1904. [Ref. 98: p76]
This oft-quoted statement represents the view
that the argument which persuaded Russia to go to war with
Japan in 1904, and persuades other countries to engage in
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conflict today, was the desire to restore unity at home.
The idea that internal politics leads to war has been inde-
fatigable [Ref. 98: p. 77] This argument is heard frequently
as an explanation for King Hassan's decision to commit
Morocco to the war in the Western Sahara. Although it is
arguable whether inte.rnal dissent was actually the crucial
factor in the decision to launch the Sahara campaign, there
is no question that internal unity has been one of the most
significant dividends realized by King Hassan through
Morocco's participation in the conflict.
In the aftermath of the military coup attempts,
the seriousness of the problems facing the Moroccan monarchy
had assumed crisis proportions. King Hassan was faced with
paying the price for the "divide and rule" strategy he had
employed to centralize power during the first decade of his
reign. By weakening Morocco's political parties during his
struggle for influence and control in the 1960s, Hassan
found himself forced to depend almost exclusively on the
army in the 1970s. [Ref. 50: p. 140] Unfortunately, from
the standpoint of regime stability, the events of 1971 and
1972 indicated that the army could no longer be relied upon
by the king for unquestioned support.
Domestically, the Moroccan political system in
the early 1970s seemed to be wracked by permanent crisis.
Students struck, elections were boycotted, thousands of
political arrests were made and purges decimated the armed
119
forces [Ref. 67: p. 177]. The king's political isolation
made it impossible for him to achieve consensus for any of
his domestic policies. As previously discussed, it was at
this point that Hassan initiated limited but significant
reforms, realizing that further repression would not end the
crisis
.
Of all the initiatives designed to achieve unity
and generate support for the throne, none was so effective
as the Saharan "crusade." Despite the rather ironic fact
that this issue was forced on Hassan, he was quick to under-
stand and capitalize on its potential power for rebuilding a
national consensus supporting his crown. Moroccans
responded to the king's calls for liberation and integration
of the Sahara with enormous enthusiasm. Media coverage of
the "Green March" and subsequent events embellished the
monarch's role as a symbol of unity and guarantor of
defense. Hassan's call to arms also achieved two immediate
results which impacted positively on the stability of his
regime
1. The "crusade" coopted and neutralized the opposition
political parties thereby eliminating the most artic-
ulate of Morocco's domestic dissenters.
2. The Saharan campaign provided a noble cause to occupy
the minds of FAR officers and a fight to occupy their
troops--both at a safe distance from the king's
palaces. [Ref. 67: p. 179]
In immediate terms, the war in the desert has
strengthened the regime of King Hassan. The war has
120
bestowed upon Hassan, who was once considered to lack char-
isma, something approaching the nationalistic mystique- of
his father. Portraits of Mohammed V, which are always
labeled "the liberator", are invariably accompanied by
portraits of Hassan labeled "the unifier." The war has also
served to divert the attention of the masses from the
economic crisis which has been exacerbated in Morocco by
such man-made causes as mis -management and corruption.
Finally, with over half the FAR deployed in the desert, the
war has also reduced to some extent the threat of a military
takeover. [Ref. 99: p. A25]
By 1984, it was beginning to appear possible
that Morocco might prove the experts wrong and prevail in
this "unwinnable" war. King Hassan's "sand wall" strategy
has been aimed at consolidating Morocco's military position
in hopes that the Polisario and their supporters will even-
tually tire of this expensive stalemate.^ There is some
evidence that this strategy is working. Libya stopped
supplying arms to the Polisario in 1983. Algeria has
displayed increasing moderation in the international arena.
(The Saharan cause has never had much popular appeal there
^In 1980, the FAR began building a sand wall or "berm",
encircling the phosphate-producing "useful triangle" area
(approximately one-fifth) of the Western Sahara. Heavily
fortified, manned by some 80,000 troops and augmented by the
latest in electronic technology, the "berm" has enabled the
FAR to hold the Polisario 's guerilla fighters at bay and
exclude them from the useful triangle
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anyway.) If external support for the Polisario were to dry
up, the rebels would be forced to re-evaluate their slogan,
"The whole country or martyrdom." [Ref. 100: p. A67] Under
those conditions it's possible that an arrangement could be
found that would combine some degree of autonomy with offi-
cial Moroccan sovereignty and provide both sides with an
honorable way out. [Ref. 46: p. 124]
That sort of solution to the conflict would
immediately remove the war as a factor which compounds
Morocco's economic crisis. It would also excise the sense
of common cause which has been a stabilizing factor for the
regime for the last ten years. It would not, however, elim-
inate the chronic economic, social and political strains
which the king's Saharan "crusade" has been able to effec-
tively mask over the same period.
b. Long-term Dangers
As far as Morocco is concerned, the question of the
Western Sahara has already been answered. There is no
need whatsoever from a domestic political point of view
for the king to hold a referendum. For Moroccans, it
would be the equivalent of holding a referendum to
decide the future of Florida. What's the point? --An
American diplomat in Rabat [Ref. 96: p. 35]
The Moroccan frame of mind on this issue is
largely, responsible for the lack of progress toward a
diplomatic settlement. In addition, there is nothing on the
military front likely to decrease Moroccan intransigence
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toward the question of referendum or negotiation with the
Polisario. Even if the Moroccan attitude were to soften,. it
is hard to conceive of a diplomatic strategy that would be
as effective as the sand wall strategy has been on the
Saharan front. [Ref. 96: p. 35] However, Morocco's improved
military position als.o increases the vulnerability of the
king and suggest future problems for the conduct of the war.
One of the factors explaining the FAR's poor
performance against the Polisario 's guerillas in the early
years of the desert war was an overcentralized command and
control system. King Hassan had dispersed military units in
1972 and insisted that all military communications be
filtered through Rabat as a preventive measure against
further coup attempts. [Ref. 92: p. 302] However, the
revised military tactics, which have turned the battlefield
picture around, required greater command integration and
decentralization of control over weaponry, ammunition and
tactical decisions. This freedom to operate enabled mili-
tary commanders to neutralize the Polisario 's "rat patrol"
guerilla tactics, but it also made military action against
the throne feasible once again. It's possible that malcon-
tents in the officer corps have already tried to move on the
palace. The mysterious 1983 death of General Dlimi, the
Moroccan Chief of Staff, gave birth to rumors that his death
came as a result of his involvement in a plot against the
king. [Ref. 55: p. BIO]
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Three longer term considerations should be
weighed when evaluating the advantages Morocco currently
seems to enjoy on the Saharan front. First, despite the
apparent decrease of external support for the Polisario,
military experts agree that the Sahrawi rebels require only
a low level of support to keep Morocco's troops tied down in
their defensive positions on the berm. Given the relatively
insignificant cost for Algeria of continuing to promote
Saharan self-determination, it seems unlikely that Algeria
would abandon this cause, so closely linked to a fundamental
principle of Algerian ideology. [Ref. 89: p. 5]
Secondly, the success of the sand wall strategy
and the impact of the Treaty of Oujda (the Moroccan-Libyan
"pact of African unity", signed in August 1984) had the
effect of hardening the Algerian attitude. The perception
of a threat to its own security could tempt Algeria to esca-
late its support for the Sahrawi rebels by providing them
with the sophisticated weapons needed to overcome the
Moroccan berm's lethal, high technology defenses. Each
escalation of the conflict increases both the risk that the
desert war will spill over other international borders and
the possibility of direct conflict between Moroccan and
Algerian troops. [Ref. 101: pp. 28-31]
Finally, there are practical limits to how far
the sand wall strategy can be carried, no matter how
successful it has been. There are already over 100,000
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Moroccan troops in the region with 80,000 tied up on the
berm alone, yet the Polisario are still free to roam over
almost 80 percent of the territory. The idea of building
longer and more distant sand walls has become increasingly
impractical simply because of its prohibitive expense.
Perhaps the greatest long-term danger of the war
is the unrealistic expectations it has raised for the peace.
There are occasional "stargazing" comments overheard in
Morocco, reminiscent of Egypt immediately after the Camp
David accords, about how much better life will be when the
war is over. Yet it is wishful thinking to believe that
peace will bring an end to Morocco's problems. [Ref. 3: p.
33]
Although war-related costs have aggravated
economic problems, the root causes of those problems-
-
drought, the global recession, fallen phosphate prices and
an exploding population- -are independent of expenses related
to the Saharan conflict [Ref. 94: p. 177]. The January 1984
riots showed how distressed the Moroccan citizenry has
become over the necessity for economic sacrifice. The
Saharan campaign, which bought Hassan a 10-year hiatus from
the "king's dilemma", may not divert the masses much longer,
whether the war continues to consume Morocco's vitally
needed resources or ends in victory.
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VI. FOREIGN DEPENDENCE
The desert war has generated military requirements which
have forced King Hassan to seek a closer military relation-
ship with the West. To the extent that Western military
assistance is perceived by his people as dependence on the
West, it undermines the legitimacy of Hassan's claims to
represent Moroccan independence and Arab nationalism for the
reasons discussed in Chapter II. In this chapter, we will
discuss the nature of Morocco's dependence on foreign
powers, the extent of U.S. penetration in Morocco and the
impact of that penetration on the stability of the monarchy.
Although the focus of this chapter is on current conditions
in Morocco, the first point which must be emphasized is the
relatively benign impact Morocco's unique colonial experi-
ence has had on its national psyche.
A. NATURE OF MOROCCO'S DEPENDENCY
In our protectorate, we do not regard or treat the
natives as an inferior race, merely as another race.
--Marshall Lyautey, Resident General of Morocco, 1917.
[Ref. 102: p. 88]
Partly for self-imposed reasons and partly due to geog-
raphy, Morocco spent several centuries isolated from the
rest of the Arab world. When the country finally came under
French and Spanish rule at the beginning of the 20th
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century, its long history as a sovereign nation encouraged
the colonial powers to attempt to accommodate their rule- to
Morocco's traditional Arab-Islamic culture. [Ref. 103: p.
482] In this respect, Morocco's experience was unique, not
only in the Middle East, but also in North Africa.
When the French o.ccupied Algeria in 1830, there were
only three accepted methods of dealing with native cultures:
extinction, expulsion and repression. [Ref. 102: p. 9]
France chose the latter as its Algerian policy, the legacy
of which was the savage war of independence fought 125 years
later by the embittered descendants of generations of the
oppressed. In Morocco, the case was entirely different.
Although the country was still subdued by force of arms, the
protectorate was characterized by a degree of sensititivity
,
tact and fairness toward the native population heretofore
unprecedented in colonial administration. This is by no
means to say that native Moroccans were contented with
French rule or would have gladly shed blood to defend it
(although significant numbers served under French colors in
both Wars), only that by the standards of the day, French
rule in Morocco was relatively enlightened.
Out of consideration for the pride of the Moroccan
people, the French took pains to maintain the fiction that
Morocco was a sovereign state, referring to it at all times
as the "Sheriffian Empire", and requiring the concurrence of
the sultan in the laws proposed by the French resident
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general. France was careful not to denigrate the prestige
of the sultanate by continuing to surround the sultan in the
pomp and circumstance which the people of the time expected
of their rulers. The administrative policy was one of
control rather than command, direction instead of repres-
sion, and a velvet glove rather than an iron fist.
[Ref. 104: pp. 361-2]
As we noted in Chapter II, writers like Fanon and Memmi
concerned themselves with the possibility of whether the
formerly colonized would ever be able to integrate their
native heritage with the legacy of their colonial past. In
the Iranian case, the system of indirect colonialism fed
already prevalent xenophobic tendencies which are prominent
among the factors which explain that society's rejection of
the West. In Morocco, Marshall Lyautey's plan was to
preserve as much autonomy and native culture as possible.
The relatively sympathetic treatment of the protectorate at
the hands of the French made the reconciliation of Eastern
and Western cultures easier in Morocco. [Ref. 105: pp.
3-12] As a result, Morocco's nationalism was relatively free
of the xenophobia which had characterized other nationalist
movements in the Middle East. Mohammed V actually spoke of
Morocco as a "trait d' union"- -a bridge between the East and
the West. [Ref. bla: pp. 135-6]
Despite the fact that Lyautey's successors reverted to
more conventional colonial policies, cultural assimilation
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was never pursued with the same vigor in Morocco as in other
parts of the French Empire. One result was that the post-
independence Moroccan was less likely to be tormented by the
question of whether to identify with the European or his own
culture. In other words, Morocco emerged from its colonial
era with its sense of .national identity intact.
Compared to the psychological scars carried by most
newly independent nations, Morocco currently possess a
healthy and secure self-image. Moroccan leaders find it
easier to make decisions on how to modernize their country,
revitalize their culture or interact with the center nations
of the Western world on a purely pragmatic rather than
emotional basis. The most significant constraints created
by Moroccan dependence on the center tend to be material and
economic rather than psychological.
Material dependence can be particularly acute when, as
in Morocco's case, a country wishes to modernize rapidly and
is heavily dependent on commodity exports to provide foreign
exchange for development [Ref. 95: p. 8]. When the bottom
fell out of the world phosphate market in 1980, Morocco
became more reliant than ever on the largess of its foreign
benefactors and international financial organizations. The
impact of the country's inability to steer its own course
was quickly felt.
As previously discussed, IMF dictated austerity measures
forced Morocco to cut back on non-essential imports and food
129
subsidies, and to postpone its Five Year Development Plan.
Although these IMF conditions were intended to restore
balance to the economy, their burden fell on the shoulders
of those least able to bear them. The apparent results of
the IMF's attempts to promote financial rigor were the 1981
and 1984 food riots (known in Morocco as the "troubles").
Yet Morocco's position in the international economic system
has left it little alternative other than to accept the
measures its creditors and benefactors dictated. In fact,
the critical and immediate nature of Morocco's economic and
security problems has compelled it to accept expertise,
trade, capital and security assistance on whatever terms are
offered.
In Morocco, such processes as the demands of the inter-
national lending institutions and world commerce in arms and
military training have particular relevance. From the view-
point of dependency theorists, the problem is that these
processes create a degree of penetration by external powers
that leads to extreme economic and socio-political distor-
tions. These in turn result in societal unrest similar to
that which has so recently occurred in Morocco. The resul-
tant "spiral of conflict and coercion" continues until the
regime either cracks down or is replaced by one that will.
[Ref. 88: p. 470]
The recent "troubles" in Morocco indicate that the
kingdom may be dangerously close to just such a situation.
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Thus dependency, as it relates to the stability of the
Moroccan monarchy, stands as still another factor which
magnifies the effects of the "king's dilemma." Morocco's
emerging elites, already somewhat disaffected by the gap
between their aspirations and the opportunities available to
them, are becoming further estranged from the present system
by its apparent institutionalization of inequality via
center to center dependency.
Although the renewed level of American interest in
Morocco has received a lot of public attention, the French
still completely dominate the center of Moroccan society in
terms of presence, trade and cultural influence. Even
though the pre- independence presence of over 300,000
Frenchmen has shrunk to only 50,000, the French foreign
community is still the largest in Morocco. With an official
presence of over 8000, Frenchmen form trained cadres at
almost every level of commerce, science and education. In
comparison, the American presence of just over 300,
including the Peace Corps, is miniscule. [Ref. 46: p. 132]
The volume of trade between Morocco and France is three
to four times greater than Morocco's trade with the United
States or any of its other European trading partners
[Ref. 106: p. 278]. The 450,000 Moroccans who live and work
in France reinforce Morocco's French connection and help
decrease Morocco's negative trade balance. Since 1980,
worker remittances from France have averaged almost $1
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billion annually. This amount is almost equivalent to the
combined contributions of phosphates, farm exports and
tourism to external accounts. [Ref. 78: p. 2.]
Neither does America compete with the French cultural
connection. For example, there are 25,000 Moroccans in
French schools compared to only 350 enrolled in the United
States. Most importantly, French is still the preeminent
language of technical and commercial intercourse and will
remain so for the foreseeable future. Ironically, despite
such indications of the overwhelming impact of
"Francophonie" on Moroccan life, and despite the obvious
ascendancy of French stakes in Morocco, there remains some
question as to whether Moroccans perceive France as the most
important external power in the region. [Ref. 46: p. 135]
French rapprochement with Algeria following the election
of Francois Mitterand seriously strained its ties with
Morocco. In 1982, France announced the suspension of deliv-
eries of arms and spare parts to Morocco until the question
of Morocco's delinquency in payments was resolved. Rabat
read this as a sign of the Socialist government's tilt
toward Algeria in the Western Sahara conflict. Although
French arms deliveries have since resumed, the incident
caused Morocco to question French reliability as an arms
supplier. [Ref. 107: p. 27] As a result, Moroccan arms
purchases from the U.S. have increased considerably. For
example, in the last three years, the U.S. has supplied over
$250 million in arms to Morocco [Ref. 108: pp. 3].
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Such developments are perhaps what prompted former U.S.
Ambassador to Morocco Richard Parker to note that "American
officials on the scene are convinced that the United States
is the number one foreign power in Morocco, while the French
think they are number one." [Ref. 46: p. 135] Officials of
the Reagan administration have been particularly visible in
attempting to reinforce this perception of a new American
commitment to Morocco. A logical starting point for tracing
the evolution of this new American commitment to Morocco is
World War II.
B. THE AMERICAN CONNECTION
1. World War II to the Western Sahara
During World War II, the U. S . -Moroccan relationship
was influenced by the conflict between American interests in
dealing with the wartime French administration and American
ideals regarding self-determination. The contradictory
signals sent by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca
Conference of 1943 illustrate the uncertain nature of
America's commitment to self-determination for colonial
people. On one hand, F.D.R. insisted on privately meeting
with Sultan Mohammed V over the objections of French author-
ities. That meeting strengthened the sultan's belief that
the United States would support Moroccan demands for full
independence from France after the war. On the other hand,
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the reality of F.D.R.'s actions did not support the nation-
alist's hopes, as he consistently spoke of full restoration
of France to the administration of her colonies. [Ref. 109:
pp. 133-5]
Following the war, U.S. diplomacy again took a back
seat to that of France in the region. U.S. diplomats
expressed the opinion that the people of Morocco would best
advance under French tutelage. At the same time, they tried
to influence the French to implement policies which would
lead to the gradual evolution of the Moroccan people toward
self-government as they became increasingly capable of
managing their own affairs. This middle of the road
approach seemed the only way to balance the U.S. interest in
the political stability of the area with its interest in
insuring the continued good will of both France and Morocco.
[Ref. 110: pp. 687-98]
When it became apparent that the middle of the road
stance was unpopular on both sides, the pressures of the
cold war and the NATO alliance caused America to line up
more solidly behind France [Ref. Ill: p. 128]. Yet despite
the irritation and disillusionment caused by U.S. unwill-
ingness to support North African nationalism, Moroccan
nationalists persisted in their faith in the basic anti-
colonial goodwill of the United States [Ref. Ill: pp 177-8].
For example, during the height of anti-French terrorism in
Morocco in 1954, the nationalists stationed a soldier in
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front of every American house to guard it against any inad-
vertent violence [Ref. 10: p. 189], -
After Morocco's independence, the evolution of the
bloody civil war in Algeria led to the deployment of 400,000
French soldiers to Algeria, substantially weakening NATO's
continental strength.
.
The resultant concern this raised for
the alliance's security caused a number of leading
Americans, including John F. Kennedy, to oppose French colo-
nial policy in North Africa, reemphasizing America's
missionary role as a champion of freedom in the world.
I am concerned that we are failing to meet the challenge
of imperialism. ... It has repeatedly been appealed for
discussion before the United Nations, wherever equivocal
frameworks and opposition to its consideration have
deemed our leadership and prestige in that body.... It
has affected our standing in the eyes of the free world,
our prestige. and our security ... .No , Algeria is no
longer a problem for the French alone nor will it ever
be again. [Ref. 109: p. 118]
This speech, which was delivered in July 1957, stands as a
watershed event in U.S. -North African relations, but not
because it was followed by any immediate or substantive
policy change. Its primary importance was symbolic as it
reinforced in Moroccan eyes the identification of America
with the ideals FDR had earlier expressed in the Atlantic
Charter and the "Four Freedoms."
Since that time, the U.S., while never directly
challenging France's traditional economic primacy in the
kingdom, has gradually increased its own political and
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military support for the Moroccan regime. When relations
between Paris and Rabat were temporarily ruptured in 1965
over the Ben Barka affair,^" the U.S. took advantage of the
opportunity to develop more significant political ties.
[Ref. 49: p. 119] The most significant growth area in
U . S . -Moroccan relations, however has been military.
In 1974, the Ford administration sent a military
mission to Morocco to assess the ability of the kingdom's
armed forces to defend the country in the event of a war
with Algeria. The mission recommended an extensive modern-
ization and rearmament program for the Royal Armed Forces.
[Ref. 49: p. 122] Under the plan, foreign military sales
(FMS) agreements with the U.S. rose from only $8.2 million
in FY 1974 to $242 million in FY 1975 [Ref. 67: p. 356].
The Ford administration continued its military support for
King Hassan's regime even though it became almost immedi-
ately apparent that the regime's motives for rearmament were
more related to irredentist claims in the Western Sahara
than self defense. [Ref. 112: p. A13]
^
"Mehdi Ben Barka, a founder member of the Istiqlal, was
sentenced to death "in absentia" for his alleged involvement
in a plot against the king. He disappeared in Paris in
1965, presumably assassinated at the orders of Hassan's
Chief of Staff, General Oufkir. The manner of his assassi-
nation provoked a major rupture in relations between Rabat
and Paris that continued until 1972.
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2. The U.S. and the Desert War
The different world view held by the Carter adminis-
tration, at least during its first three years in office,
caused it to scale back U.S. military support for King
Hassan's regime. The foreign policy approach taken by
President Carter's administration has been characterized as
"regionalist . " Initially, the Carter team saw the world's
problems as essentially the manifestations of such issues as
underdevelopment and local disputes. They tended to look
for regional answers to what they saw as regional problems.
Arms sales were of secondary importance from this
perspective, often seen as a policy instrument which served
only to exacerbate regional tensions. [Ref. 113: pp. 360-1]
When the administration learned that Morocco, in violation
of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and a U. S . -Moroccan
agreement signed in 1960, was employing U.S. weapons in the
Sahara for uses unrelated to internal security or self
defense, it enacted restrictions on the sale of further
offensive weapons to Morocco [Ref. 49: p. 122].
The administration's restrictions on arms sales, as
well as its regional perspective, were soon overcome by the
pressure of global events. The overthrow of Somoza, the
fall of the shah, the hostage crisis and the invasion of
Afghanistan led to a more "conservative" interpretation of
the nature of the world's problems. In Kissinger's view.
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Carter's weakness had transformed "inchoate unrest into a
revolution." The shah hesitated to take decisive action,
Kissinger explained, because:
He must have had doubts about our real intentions.
Whether we like it or not, the shah was considered our
close ally in that area for 37 years. He left office
under the visible urging of the United States. Other
local leaders might fear similar treatment by America
and would seek alliances elsewhere. [Ref. 114: p 371]
The Carter administration, shaken by this string of
foreign policy disasters and apparently sharing some of
Kissinger's fears, felt compelled to reinforce its support
for valued friends in the Third World. In addition, it
adjusted its strategic thinking by placing greater emphasis
on the East-West dimensions of problems in the Middle East
and North Africa. Finally, it abandoned the regionalist
approach to security problems that had been introduced with
the Nixon Doctrine. Thus, the ability to project American
forces into the region began to play an important role in
American military planning. [Ref. 114: pp. 371-3]
One other factor entered into the Carter administra-
tion's calculations regarding U. S . -Moroccan military rela-
tions. By 1979, the tactical situation in the desert war
had become rather bleak. It seemed possible that Morocco
might have to withdraw its irredentist claims to the Western
Sahara. Furthermore, there were reports of Polisario incur-
sions into Moroccan territory. It was widely agreed that
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that defeat or precipitate withdrawal would cost Hassan his
crown if not his life. Thus, in the context of imminent
disaster to the Moroccan monarch, as well as the previously
cited global events, the Carter administration approved a
$235 million sale of OV-lOs, F-5Es and Hughes helicopter
gunships to Morocco, despite their obvious offensive, coun-
terinsurgency utility. [Ref. 115: p. 133]
Following the renewal of offensive arms shipments to
Morocco, the Polisario realized only one significant mili-
tary success, the attack on the Moroccan garrison at Guelta
Zemmbur in October of 1981. In the course of this battle,
the Polisario downed five Moroccan aircraft, some by Soviet
Sam 6 missiles. [Ref. 49: p. 99]
By the end of 1981, the battlefield crisis had
subsided. As has been previously discussed, greater decen-
tralization of Moroccan command and control probably had as
much to do with Morocco's battlefield success as American
equipment. Nonetheless, 1981 marked a clear turning point,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, in U . S . -Moroccan
military relations. The arms transactions approved by the
Carter administration certainly had a significant tactical
impact. If nothing else, the American supplied OV-lOs, Huey
gunships, cluster bombs and electronic detection devices
blunted the effectiveness of the Polisario 's hit and run
"rat patrol" tactics. Even more significant, however, was
the qualitative shift, begun in the waning days of the
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Carter administration and enthusiastically continued by the
Reagan administration, to a "globalist" foreign policy.
The Reagan administration rejected the view that
changes in the international system over the last twenty-
five years had limited U.S. ability to shape regional
events. It saw the string of unfavorable global events that
occurred during the Carter administration as consequences of
America's failure to assert its power. The basic element of
the Reagan foreign policy is a distinctly bi-polar world-
view, emphasizing "the Soviet Union, its military buildup
and its 'misbehavior' in the developing world." [Ref. 116:
p. 44] Arms sales have been given a much higher priority in
the competition with the Soviet Union. This has been espe-
cially evident in North Africa.
One of the administration's first acts was the
approval of the sale of 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco, sending a
clear signal that the days of the arms transaction as an
"exceptional instrument of foreign policy" were ended. It
was in the same spirit that the administration removed the
limitation that transfers to Morocco be contingent upon
continued Moroccan progress toward a negotiated settlement
of the Western Sahara issue. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Morris Draper, in testimony before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, declared:
America's allies and close associates should expect
understanding and reliable support. It would not be in
the spirit of the administration's policies if support
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for America's traditional and historic friends--to meet
reasonable and legitimate needs- -were to be withheld or
made conditional other than under extraordinary circum-
stances .... the administration feels strongly that tradi-
tional old friends such as Morocco deserve special
understanding. [Ref. 117: p. 5, p. 14]
The recently departed American Ambassador to
Morocco, Joseph Reed, . was an unabashed 4th of July salesman
for America- -wryly dubbed by sophisticated Moroccans as
"Mister America." [Ref. 74: p. 25] An open admirer of King
Hassan, Reed enjoyed easy access to the king and was the
only envoy allowed to fly around the kingdom in his own
government's airplane [Ref. 73: p. 44]. The ambassador
succinctly summarized the impact of Reagan policy on his
approach to U. S . -Moroccan relations.
Morocco sits. at the strategic straights of the
Mediterranean. It is clear how Morocco is important to
the survivability of Europe. My mandate is to move
ahead with the Reagan Plan for Morocco. My mandate is
to illustrate to our friends around the globe that the
Reagan administration wanted to single out Morocco as
the primary example of how America supported a proven
ally and friend. [Ref. 118: p. A3]
His enthusiasm reflects that felt by the Reagan
administration for King Hassan. Hassan probably shares
President Reagan's views on world politics to a greater
degree than any other Arab leader. Like the president, the
king believes that the Soviet Union poses the greatest
threat to the region's security. Hassan also feels the
Carter administration wavered in its support of its proven
141
friends. [Ref. 55: p. B18] Official U.S. rhetoric, during
Ambassador Reed's tenure, unfailingly referred to the Soviet
threat while emphasizing the depth of U.S. commitment to the
king.
I keep saying to the Moroccans: 'Count on us. We are
with you.' I believe we must keep our word. I really
do believe the Soviet Union is the only remaining nine-
teenth century empire, and to me it is obvious that the
next pressure point for the Soviets is going to be the
Kingdom of Morocco, situated strategically as it is on
the Straights of Gibraltar. [Ref. 74: p. 25]
Hassan provides the United States with a reliable
Arab friend, a role once played by Egypt (which is currently
under pressure to distance itself from the United States
diplomatically). As previously discussed, Hassan's private
channels of influence have been useful in the past to the
United States and other Western powers. From Hassan's
perspective, the U.S. provides:
1. The political support of a superpower for Morocco's
efforts to gain international recognition of its
annexation of the Western Sahara.
2. Military aid which has enabled the FAR to achieve at
least stalemate in the desert war.
3. To a lesser extent, investment and financial aid to
Morocco's stricken economy.
We have already noted that U.S. penetration has had
its greatest impact in the area of military relations. The
growing level of U.S. military aid, in the form of FMS
credits, military assistance program (MAP) grants, and
international military education and training (IMET)
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appropriations, has altered the nature of what had been
primarily a commercial relationship.^^ [Ref. 67: p. 357]. To
a large extent, congressional restraint and Moroccan finan-
cial difficulties have prevented even closer military ties.
Nevertheless, Moroccan officials have made it clear that the
Reagan administration '.s programs have a symbolic and psycho-
logical value that goes beyond their quantitative dimen-
sions. Congressional analysts agree that the perceived
increase in American military support for Morocco is viewed
by Moroccans as the major new feature in U. S . -Moroccan
bi-lateral relations. [Ref. 4: p. 10]
In May 1982, the U.S. and Morocco signed an agree-
ment giving the U.S. access to Moroccan air bases during
undefined regional emergencies. Because of Moroccan sensi-
tivity to the idea of "American bases" on Moroccan soil, the
exact nature of the "quid pro quos" has never been released,
but one can safely assume that the obvious growth in mili-
tary relations since 1982 is connected. [Ref. 119: p. A3]
Earlier that year, the two countries had agreed to a
U. S . -Moroccan joint military commission (JMC).
^^The Carter administration requested and received
authority for $150.7 million military grant/aid for Morocco.
The Reagan administration, during its first term, won
approval for $242.3 million in FMS credits, MAP or IMET out
of over $300 million requested.
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From the globalist perspective, that arrangement was
seen as tantamount to a military alliance against Soviet and
Libyan influence in the region. According to a Moroccan
official, Morocco's goals in the JMC were to increase mutual
understanding and to provide Moroccans with American know-
how and training. , "Someday," said the same official,
"Morocco and the United States might have to fight
together." He added that, "Morocco has a long way to go
before it could envision joint exercises with F-16s."
[Ref. 4: p. 9]
As long as the desert war continues, Morocco will
require a steady supply of arms. Moreover, due to its
current economic problems and structural state of depen-
dence, Morocco will require concessionary terms to finance
its military purchases. The Reagan administration has so
far been willing to be Morocco's military patron. As the
statements in the preceding paragraph imply, Moroccan expec-
tations from its military relationship with the United
States are high. The question that remains is to what
extent both the perceptions and actual dimensions of
Morocco's growing military dependence on the United States
affect the stability of King Hassan in political, military
and economic terms.
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C. IMPACT OF MOROCCO'S MILITARY DEPENDENCE
1. America' s Lethal Embra:ce
Hassan, who opened his palace to the shah during his
exile and to members of the shah's family afterward, has had
ample opportunity to observe firsthand the dangers of being
perceived as a puppet of American interests. He has been
sensitive to the political consequences of perceived overde-
pendence since the first days of his reign. For example,
public pressure was the most significant element in the
Moroccan decision to force the U.S. to evacuate its Moroccan
air bases in 1963. Much of Hassan's legitimacy has always
been derived from the association of his crown with Moroccan
independence. Thus, the king is somewhat of a prisoner to
his own nationalist popularity whenever issues relating to
foreign dependence arise. [Ref. 60: pp. 58-60] Yet the same
force works to counteract perceptions of overdependence when
the issue is the conflict in the Western Sahara.
Occasionally, reports surface that the desert war is
"Hassan's war" and that popular support for the war within
Morocco is ebbing. These reports are simply not true. As
has been acknowledged, Hassan exploited the circumstances of
this crisis to enhance his legitimacy in a number of ways.
However, Hassan neither originated the issue of Moroccan
claims to the Western Sahara nor has he been at the fore-
front of its champions. The timing of the Sahara campaign
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was dictated by the Spanish decision to withdraw from Rio de
Oro, not by the king's domestic problems. If Hassan had not
moved in 1975, the FAR probably would have invaded the
Sahara without him. Since that time, the war has been
backed by a national consensus and broad public support.
[Ref. 94: pp. 173-4] .
During a recent congressional visit to Morocco,
several members of congress discovered the extent to which
support for the war spans the Moroccan political spectrum.
At a meeting with government officials and opposition
leaders, certain members of congress directed rather stri-
dent criticism of the regime's intransigence on Western
Saharan issues toward their Moroccan hosts. Abderraihim
Bouabid, one of Morocco's major opposition figures and the
first secretary of the Popular Union of Socialist Forces
(Morocco's Communist Party), declared that the congressional
delegation was trying to blackmail the Moroccan government.
Bouabid added, "if this is going to be your attitude, we
regret it, deplore it, and we will turn elsewhere for the
arms we need to defend ourselves." [Ref. 120: p. 64] One
would have to conclude that the nationalist fervor generated
by the Saharan campaign is likely to overrule any opposing
political forces resulting from Morocco's military depen-
dence on the United States.
At the most fundamental level, the U. S . -Moroccan
military relationship has had a positive impact on short
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term regime survivability. The arms transfers approved at
the end of the Carter administration, and the additional
assistance provided at the beginning of the Reagan adminis-
tration (particularly following the debacle at Guelta
Zemmour) , came at critical junctures in the desert war.
Although the war is not "Hassan's war", it was the king, who
by so closely identifying his crown with the cause, elevated
it to the level of "national crusade." Just as Hassan's
choices were limited by nationalist fervor over the American
bases issue in 1963, so is he the "apprentice ot his own
sorcery" regarding the Saharan "crusade" in 1985. After ten
years of sacrifice, it would be unrealistic to expect Hassan
to admit that the "crusade" had failed, that so many lives
and so much treasure had been squandered. Yet from 1978
through 1981, that outcome seemed to be a distinct
possibility
.
If events had taken that course, it seems almost
certain that the FAR would have not only blamed their defeat
(with at least some justification) on the king but would
have moved immediately to- overthrow him. [Ref . 61: p. 5]
Increased U.S. military aid averted both possibilities by
improving Morocco's military capability to meet the
Polisario threat.
Politically, U.S. assistance bolstered the regime of
King Hassan by sending the message that America would once
again stand by its friends in time of crisis. However, the
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beneficial political effects of closer U. S . -Moroccan ties
can be overstated. To the extent that the U. S . -Moroccan
relationship is perceived to contradict the tenets of funda-
mentalist Islam, its potential for destabilizing the
monarchy must also be considered. As discussed in Chapter
II, resurgent fundamentalist Islam is rejecting such colo-
nial era socio-political models and ideologies as secular
nationalism, organized parties and military elites
[Ref. 121: p. 24]. Its view of the West as corrupting its
traditions further undercuts the legitimacy of modernizing,
pro-Western leaders in the Islamic world [Ref. 71: p. 111].
French journalists report that members of the League
of Islamic Youth, in cooperation with the Marxist-Leninist
"Hal-Amam" movement, were among the leaders of last year's
civil uprisings. Moroccan security forces seized leaflets
alleged to have been distributed by these groups that
claimed that Morocco's financial difficulties were due not
so much to the war, nor the drought, but to the "plundering
of our riches by Americans and enemies." They characterized
the recent Islamic conference held in Casablanca as a "blind
conspiracy manipulated by the two great Satans: America and
the USSR." [Ref. 122: p. 8] Such sentiment is by no means
widespread, at least not at the present. Nonetheless, its
chilling similarity to the slogans that preceded the fall of
the shah underscores the hazards posed by being perceived as
"America's king."
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The French have pointed out that they would prefer
that America tone down its growing involvement in Morocjco.
Although French motives for making this point may be not
entirely above suspicion, both the French and the United
States share an overriding interest in the crown's
stability. The French have warned against "explicit, overt
demonstrations" of American friendship, perhaps fearing that
an "American kiss of death" could have the same outcome for
Hassan as it did for the shah. [Ref. 4: p. 6]
2. Moving Closer to the Brink
A clear problem suggested by the overwhelmingly
military orientation of U.S. policy is that it almost
completely ignores the political and economic ramifications
of the Western Sahara issue. It can be argued that these
internal forces pose an even more serious threat to Hassan's
stability than does the war. Congressional critics of U.S.
military support for Morocco fear that this assistance has
enabled King Hassan to hold on rather than negotiate in the
desert war.
From their point of view, the king's "sand wall"
strategy is seen not as aimed at defeating the Polisario but
merely achieving a military stalemate and wearing the guer-
illas and their supporters down. In the first place, these
critics point out, the cost of the war (at least indirectly)
exacerbates Morocco's adverse economic situation. In a sort
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of "worst-case dependency" scenario, they fear that
Morocco's continued economic deterioration, by creating the
ideal breeding ground for the coalescence of the impover-
ished masses, disenchanted elites, "intelligentsia" and
Islamic fundamentalists, could effectively mobilize the
disparate forces calling for radical political change.
[Ref. 120: p. 40.]
A related fear is that the symbolic and psycholog-
ical dimensions of American support may have raised unreal-
istic expectations in the FAR. By giving Hassan's military
leaders undue hope that the war is winnable, despite the
unanimity of expert opinion that it is not, the U.S. may be
helping to trap Hassan in the Saharan quagmire. The longer
the war drags on without a military victory, the greater
Hassan's vulnerability to military plots. ^^ For example, the
mysterious death of General Ahmed Dlimi, King Hassan's
closest military and security advisor, bears the mark of a
political assassination. A report which appeared in Le
Monde connects Dlimi 's death with reports of an attempted
military coup by a group of officers led by him and impa-
tient with the conduct of the war [Ref. 123: p. 183].
^
^Should Hassan fall to a military coup in circumstances
similar to these, U.S. interests would be adversely impacted
in two ways. First, the successor military regime would
probably be hostile to the external powers most closely
associated with the discredited ruler's policies. Secondly,
the new military regime might feel compelled to escalate the
level of military action to restore Morocco's honor on the
battlefield.
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The United States and France, which together supply
virtually all of Morocco's arms, share some responsibility
for Hassan's unwillingness to work more diligently for a
long term solution to the Western Sahara problem. To the
extent that U.S. support encourages Morocco to neglect its
pressing domestic problems in pursuit of an illusory victory
in the desert, it acts against both countries' interests.
William Bundy suggests that nations need to weigh the rela-
tive importance of economic and military strength.
Arms races in many parts of the world represent a diver-
sion to military purposes of enormous resources that
might otherwise be used in the direction of progress.
Is the military power these nations seek really useable
even for the objectives envisaged? In seeking it, are
they not sacrificing not only the welfare of their
people but the roots of their economic strength- -and are
we and the other Western nations not assisting them in
this wrong emphasis? [Ref . 124: p. 40]
•
For Morocco's Western supporters, this question is impor-
tant; for her king it is critical.
Following recent reports of direct clashes between
Moroccan and Algerian forces, the danger of a "real war"
between the regional rivals looms ever more ominously. A
head-on confrontation makes no sense for either side, but
both sides are tempted to indulge in "brinksmanship . " In
such a situation, it's always possible that one side may go
too far. [Ref. 125: p. 21] Internationalization of the
conflict would lead to tragedy for both countries, raising
the specter of superpower involvement as well as further
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escalation. From that perspective, continued contributions
to Morocco's growing arsenal would seem to threaten not only
King Hassan's regime but the stability of the entire region.
The events we have summarized have shown that
neither an exclusively regionalist nor a globalist approach
to U. S . -Moroccan relations is likely to contribute to the
stability of the Moroccan regime. During the 1979-1982 time
frame, the "globalist", military-oriented nature of U.S.
assistance may have been the most appropriate way to help
Morocco weather a serious military crisis. In addition, the
highly visible nature of U.S. support bolstered the regime
by suggesting that if King Hassan were threatened, the
United States would act more "forthrightly in his support
than it did when the shah was being threatened." [Ref. 74:
p. 25]
Since 1982, direct threats to Morocco's security
have gradually subsided. A regional approach may now be the
best way to advance U.S. interests in the Moroccan crown's
survival. In the present environment, Morocco no longer
finds it as necessary to suppress its desire to operate with
some independence in the international system. As already
discussed, the Morocco-Libya accord illustrates Moroccan
resistance to attempts by the center to influence its
foreign policy. Simultaneously, U.S. policy has begun to
show more sensitivity to the war's heavy impact on Morocco's
limited financial and human resources. For example.
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military aid dropped in FY 1984 to only $40 million, almost
all which was spent on spare parts and maintenance for
existing weapons systems. [Ref. 97: p. CI] Although the
Reagan administration has yet to issue a definitive foreign
policy statement on Northwest Africa, there is a growing
realization that Hassan must end his unwillingness to
conduct substantive negotiations with his opposition (the
Sahrawis, the Polisario and Algeria). [Ref. 126: p. 15]
The U.S. position among Morocco's center nations is
particularly ticklish. Since American penetration in
Morocco is almost exclusively military, the U.S. has lacked
much leverage with which to exercise influence once the
battlefield crisis subsided. In addition, the intensely
nationalistic nature of the desert war has tended to
imprison Morocco's military patron in much the same way as
it has imprisoned its king. Thus, the mere fact of depen-
dency has been no guarantee that the center nation will be
able to influence the policies of the peripheral country.
U.S diplomacy's failure to move Hassan any closer to a nego-
tiated settlement in the Sahara typifies the uncertain rela-
tionship between influence and dependency.
King Hassan's dependency is a condition that will
persist for the foreseeable future. For center nations with
a stake in the stability of the Moroccan monarchy, the chal-
lenge has been to provide Hassan with the assistance he
needs without undermining his legitimacy or aggravating the
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undesirable effects of dependency. For King Hassan, the
challenge is to continue the difficult task of juggling the
conflicting demands arising from the desert war, the
stricken economy and his peoples' aspirations. In the mean-
time, Morocco's ruler must continue to find ways to buy time
as he struggles with a seemingly endless war which he cannot
afford to lose, but a war which many experts say he will
never be able to win.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. THE KING VS. THE SHAH
King Hassan faces an array of intimidating problems. It
is unclear how much longer he will be able to postpone his
reckoning with the "king's dilemma." Even to those who are
optimistic about the prospects of his regime, the parallels
between certain features of Moroccan society and the soci-
etal ills which brought down Iran are troubling.
Both societies experienced a tremendous rural to urban
exodus, accompanied by growing economic inequalities. Each
country has had to deal with growing numbers of educated
citizens whose. aspirations exceeded available opportuni-
ties. Neither country achieved a level of political
maturity in which authority was rationalized or structure
differentiated. In fact, not only was structure undifferen-
tiated, but there was almost no correlation between office,
power and achievement in the bureaucracies of either
country.
It would be hard to overstate the pervasiveness of
corruption in official Moroccan or Iranian life. On the
other hand, Islamic resurgence, with its emphasis on social
justice, stands in stark contrast to the greed and secula-
rism of both regimes and their elites. The most obvious
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parallel of course is between the two autocratic despots
themselves and the anachronistic institution of the
monarchy.
Yet the situations are not identical. The list of
differences exceeds in size those similarities just cited.
The nature of some of the differences (ie., sources of
legitimacy, role of Islam, leadership qualities) are espe-
cially significant. A category by category examination of
these differences highlights a number of areas in which King
Hassan and his regime enjoy relative strength.
1 . Domestic Factors
King Hassan's natural legitimacy has much deeper
roots than that of the shah. The Alawites are descended
from the Prophet and ruled Morocco for over 300 years. The
Pahlavi dynasty, in contrast, was an artificial creation.
Few Iranians were deeply impressed by the shah's exaggerated
pretensions of noble lineage. Furthermore, the shah was
psychologically hampered by his former relationships with
the colonial powers. For Hassan the "colonial legacy" rein-
forced the crown's link with the triumphal struggle for
independence
In direct contrast to the situation in Iran, every-
thing in the history of "colonial" Morocco worked to make
the monarchy a major beneficiary of independence. The
French protectorate overcame the ethnic, cultural and
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political fragmentation that had existed in the "bilad al
siba", completing the process of national unification for
the sultanate. In addition, the colonial administration
handed over a highly centralized bureaucracy with which the
sultan could effectively exercise his sovereignty for the
first time. Finally, Moroccans gained a sense of national
purpose from their struggle for independence, the circum-
stances of which strengthened the crown's identity with
Moroccan nationalism and values. Iran's colonial legacy was
merely a "myth of independence" which was not able to
sustain the country's sense of purpose when tested. Iran
realized neither the benefits of colonial administration nor
the unifying nationalist spirit which results from a
successful struggle for independence.
Following the coup attempts of the early 1970s,
there was pressure on King Hassan to emulate the shah's
"White Revolution." However, the king sidestepped the
problem of land reform by nationalizing the remaining
foreign holdings instead. The king's land policies had the
effect of retaining for him the support of the traditional
landholders who in Iran became bitter opponents of the
throne following the "White Revolution."
Unlike the shah, the king's land policies did not
alienate the Islamic establishment, who remain an important
source of the crown's legitimacy. There was no massive
redistribution of power. Thus today, Hassan's power base
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retains support from each of the traditional sources
discussed in Chapter II, with his most significant constitu-
ency composed of both traditional and modern elites. ^^
Support for the shah, as already noted, had shrunk to just
the military and portions of the elite classes in the months
preceding the revolution.
The king and the shah had fundamentally opposite
political philosophies. The shah once explained the harsh-
ness of his rule by saying, "When Iranians behave like
Swedish citizens, I'll rule like the King of Sweden."
[Ref. 24: p. 70] His almost contemptuous opinion of his
people's political maturity runs counter to the more patron-
izing view held by Hassan. Hassan views Morocco's eight
parties as "political schools" and uses them to actually
enhance his control over dangerous elements in Moroccan
society. By encouraging the formation of political "safety
valves", Hassan keeps his opponents from engaging in more
radical forms of opposition. In Iran, the lack of political
outlets forced the discontented to the Mosques, facilitating
the revolution.
^
^The landed aristocracy, merchant elite, clerical
establishment, local notables, state bureaucracy, middle
class, masses and foreign governments.
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2. Islamic Factors
Islam neither occupies the same position in Moroccan
society nor does it pose the same potential for political
activism as it did in Iran. In general, Islam plays a role
in Morocco that increases the stability of the crown and
strengthens royal authority. In Iran, on the other hand,
Shiism provides a much stronger doctrinal justification for
opposition to temporal authority. The charge of the Shiite
ulama is to perform the function of the "hidden Imam" in his
absence. In Sunni jurisprudence, the ulama do not perform
the function of the caliph, but assist the Muslim community
in doing that which God wills. Since the Sunni do not make
room for "ijtihad" (independent judgement) as do the Shia,
they have been . especially supportive of the Moroccan ruler
whom they revere as both emir and imam. [Ref. 37: pp. 34-5]
In Iran, the Islamic establishment opposed modern-
ization itself. Khomeini's views of modernizations '
s
corrupting influence were so medieval as to make any accom-
modation between his brand of Shiism and the shah's regime
unlikely. In Morocco, Islam is not in such fundamental
conflict with modernity. Islam was a valuable weapon in the
nationalist struggle and is still closely linked to national
policy. Nonetheless, there are growing signs of Islamic
unrest over the impact of secular modernization outside the
religious establishment in Morocco.
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In Morocco, the religious establishment is tied to
the king by bonds of mutual interest. In Iran, the shah and
Reza Shah before him had permanently alienated and embit-
tered the mullahs. As previously mentioned, the king in his
role as "Commander of the Faithful" derives considerable
legitimacy from the Islamic establishment.
Taken together, these factors make it unlikely that
the establishment clergy could ever play a role in a
Moroccan revolution comparable to the dominant role played
by the mullahs in Iran. On the other hand, working class
religious groups, who are generally looked down upon by the
Islamic establishment, have the potential for fanning
resentment over the regime's apparent violations of the
tenets of populist Sunni Islam.
It is possible that an alliance of army recruits and
junior officers could be formed with the socially discon-
tented among the brotherhoods, the slums, students and radi-
cals. However a number of factors make it unlikely that
such fragmented forces would ever be able to overwhelm the
Moroccan middle class, bureaucracy and elite as did the
disparate elements of Iranian society that rose against the
shah.
1. The various orders and brotherhoods lack the infras-
-tructure the Shia used to unite the diverse groups
opposed to the shah.
2. Most of Morocco's institutions are basically conser-
vative in character and would have much to lose under
conditions of radicalized fundamentalism.
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3. The military would be determined to prevent an over-
throw of the king by anyone but itself.
4. The United States would probably take action to
prevent the occurrence of "another Iran." [Ref. 70:
p. H3]
3 . Leadership Factors
Despite the devastating sense of loss experienced by
Moroccans on the day of his father's death, the circum-
stances of the accession of King Hassan to the Moroccan
throne placed him in a far better position to begin his rule
than that occupied by the shah 20 years earlier. 31 year
old Prince Moulay Hassan's education and his "hands on"
experiences as crown prince had all been designed to prepare
him for that day. Reza Shah's abdication, in contrast,
found Mohammed. Reza Pahlavi unprepared in terms of age,
education or experience to assume royal responsiblities in
Iran. It's not surprising, considering the vast differences
in their preparation to rule, that the leadership styles of
the two men vary considerably.
King Hassan's style closely resembles Crane
Brinton's model of the type of determined leadership that
makes successful revolutions unlikely . Hassan employs the
"timely combination of repression and concession", recom-
mended by Brinton, to deal with the destabilizing effects of
modernizing change. He has masterfully manipulated
Morocco's patrimonial system to control his opposition by
161
rewarding it when it cooperates with him and punishing it
when it rebels. When repressive measures are called for,, as
following the coup attempts of the 1970s, Hassan has demon-
strated the will to ruthlessly eliminate those he considers
threats
.
The shah's repressive measures, in contrast, were
usually somewhat incomplete. He seemed to lack the stomach
to take the drastic measures required to fully finish off
his most serious opponents, as when he let Khomeni off the
hook in 1963. The timing of his reforms was almost always
wrong so that rather than working as rewards to coopt his
opposition, they were seen as tactical concessions made
under pressure. To the Iranian mind, this only served to
reinforce the perception of the shah's weakness.
There seem, therefore, to be two differences between
the leadership characteristics of the shah and the king.
The first is the king's sense of when and how to apply the
autocrat's classic techniques of repression and concession.
To be sure, the Moroccan regime is as capable of brutal
activity as any, but it nonetheless has a moderate reputa-
tion by Third World standards. The modernizing process
itself inevitably causes change within traditional society
and its manifestations are often destabilizing. King
Hassan's use of the autocrat's classic tools proves that he
understands that the problem is not merely how to prevent
change, which can be done to some extent by repression, but
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how to permit change within tolerable limits. This requires
a more complex application of the range of resources at the
ruler's command. [Ref. 46: p. 31]
The last, and most important distinction between the
two rulers, is will. At the heart of the king's dilemma for
the reforming monarch,, is the question of how to share power
without losing it. To control the chaos which seems to
accompany development, rulers must sometimes exercise auto-
cratic powers. The shah, despite his masquerade as a steel-
willed autocrat, was in the end unprepared to exercise his
power as ruthlessly as would have been required to insure
his survival. Hassan has shown no similar lack of resolve.
4 . Economic Factors
Hassan has taken a relatively measured, controlled
approach to economic and social development. Perhaps the
country's relative lack of export-generated wealth has been
a blessing. We have already observed how the misguided,
over-ambitious plans of the shah resulted in instability.
With less money to spend, Morocco has avoided such grandiose
sinkholes. The King's limited economic programs allow for
some upward mobility, and his political system provides an
opportunity for his opponents to to "let off steam" rather
than revolt. Whether the present political system will
satisfy the next generation of emerging aspirant-elites is
doubtful. The fact that current economic conditions will
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not is certain. Nonetheless, King Hassan has amply demon-
strated his ability to adapt his "balancing act" to changing
conditions in the past.
The end of the global recession will alleviate some
of Morocco's immediate economic problems. Nonetheless, it
would be preposterous ,to consider the current economic situ-
ation, even in relative terms, a plus for King Hassan.
Morocco's economic problems in one way or another contribute
to almost all of its domestic instability. In addition, the
Saharan war diverts both resources and attention from their
solution. In the final analysis, even King Hassan has
acknowledged that something must be done about the extremes
of wealth and poverty in the country.
5 . Foreign Dependence
There are only about 300 Americans, including the
Peace Corps, on official status in Morocco today. Compared
to the official French presence of over 8000, this is hardly
a number to excite great interest. Moroccans are not
particularly uncomfortable with or suspicious of foreigners
in any case. This marks a clear difference between the
Moroccan and Iranian psyche. Hassan is less likely than
other Islamic leaders to be judged harshly by his own people
for his foreign association because of Morocco's long
history of European cultural orientation.
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Moroccans simply do not share share the xenophobic
tendencies which seem to characterize their Eastern Arab and
Persian brothers. This is certainly another point which
works in King Hassan's favor. The political, social and
economic ramifications of the enormous concentration of
resources required by the desert war make him more dependent
than ever on external economic and military assistance.
Since the pace of Morocco's development has been so much
slower than in Iran, economic assistance has not had the
alienating effect of seeming to deny everything that is
Moroccan. Since Moroccans associate military assistance
with the sacred cause in the Sahara, military assistance has
has few negative connotations for the suppliers.
Even so, one of the lessons the U.S. learned in Iran
was that being perceived as "America's King" poses a danger
for friendly rulers. Thus, both Morocco and the U.S. have
exercised considerable discretion in characterizing the
extent of American involvement in Morocco (the dramatic
statements of the most recent U.S. Ambassador of Morocco
notwithstanding). Even the U.S. Congress has demonstrated
its sensitivity to the delicacy of this issue by downplaying
the policy debate over the U. S . -Moroccan relationship so as
not to raise the dependency question and encourage Hassan's
domestic opposition. [Ref. 43: p. 168]
It seems extremely unlikely that King Hassan would
submit to an overly close embrace by the U.S. , having had
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firsthand knowledge of its impact on his friend, the Shah of
Iran. From that perspective, the Treaty of Oujda stands as
a particularly "imaginative act of diplomatic opportunism",
serving several immediate purposes that have already been
noted. In terms of dependency, the association with
America's anathema, Qaddafi, makes it abundantly clear that
King Hassan is first and foremost the guardian of Morocco's
interests and can not be dictated to by America. [Ref. 127:
p. 13]
B. ASSESSMENT
While a serious degree of development asymmetry exists
in Morocco, the comparison with pre-revolutionary Iran has
clearly demonstrated King Hassan's advantage over the shah
in four of the five categories discussed. Morocco's
economic plight, however, must be counted as a negative
factor for King Hassan because of its short-term insolu-
bility and because of the impact it has as a major cause of
social discontent. In addition, the war-related, long-term
threats to the throne, which the patriotic emotions of the
war have hidden, are increasingly likely to materialize as
it endlessly drags on. On the other hand, it's unlikely
that the socially discontented could be effectively mobi-
lized in opposition to King Hassan any time in the immediate
future because of the broad basis of his legitimacy and
domestic support.
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The only group with the organization and infrastructure
needed to overthrow the king and assume power in Morocco, is
the armed forces. As already noted, the king has, for the
time being at least, won their solid loyalty. Thus, barring
a cataclysmic event such as assassination, Hassan's reign
appears to be secure. Although domestic opposition could
conceivably coalesce in the future if nothing is done to
alleviate economic inequalities, Hassan is not at the moment
threatened by any indigenous uprising comparable to that
which led to the fall of the shah. The longer term future
for Morocco and its monarchy is less certain.
Morocco is blessed, by Middle East standards, with a
number of material advantages. With its phosphate reserves,
fertile agricultural lands, relative abundance of water,
rich fishing grounds and other resources, Morocco has the
potential for a broad-based economy, less dependent than
other nations in the region on a single commodity. In terms
of human resources, Moroccans are also perhaps better
equipped to handle the confrontation with modernity. The
country enjoys a long history of independent rule and a
sense of national identity that predates our own. Morocco's
citizens are relatively free of the xenophobic tendencies
which were the "colonial legacy" of Iran and most other
Islamic states.
In the assessment of Richard Parker, former U.S.
Ambassador to Morocco, it's conceivable that the Moroccan
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people, with their relatively abundant resources and rela-
tively progressive attitudes, could be mobilized to cope
with current economic problems and the absorption crisis
which looms ahead. [Ref. 46: p. 164] It would mean that
King Hassan would have to become as concerned with solving
his people's problems .as he has been with keeping himself on
the throne. It's impossible to predict Hassan's approach to
meeting these challenges, but there is one clear lesson that
can be drawn from Iran. Only King Hassan can make the crit-
ical decisions that will determine his country's future.
There may not be much external powers can do to influence
the outcome. There is probably not much they should do.
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